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PREFACE 
This is the 18th of a series of Working Papers prepared for the Pro-Poor Livestock 
Policy Initiative (PPLPI). The purpose of these papers is to explore issues related to 
livestock development in the context of poverty alleviation. 
Livestock is vital to the economies of many developing countries.  Animals are a 
source of food, more specifically protein for human diets, income, employment and 
possibly foreign exchange. For low-income producers, livestock can serve as a store of 
wealth, provide draught power and organic fertiliser for crop production and a means 
of transport. Consumption of livestock and livestock products in developing countries, 
though starting from a low base, is growing rapidly.  
The present study is part of the PPLPI effort to identify significant political and 
institutional factors and processes that currently hinder or prevent the poor in 
developing countries from taking greater advantage of opportunities to benefit from 
livestock. The study examines the political economy of European Union policy-making 
in regard to trade in livestock and livestock products (LLPs), focusing on beef and 
dairy, between the European Union and developing countries. The main objective is to 
determine and assess how relevant EU policy is made, including the role of key actors 
and forces both domestic and international. 
The way the EU makes its agriculture and trade policies involves three levels: the EU 
member state, the EU itself, and the international trading system. The study also 
considers a fourth “level,” developing countries, that is affected by EU policy-making. 
Criticism from various sources is presented concerning negative international effects 
of EU agriculture and trade policies. Recognizing the great range of trade-related 
interests among developing countries, the study analyzes relevant issues of four 
categories of such countries. EU trade and agriculture policy is strongly influenced by 
international factors, particularly by multilateral trade negotiations. Change in 
relevant EU agriculture and trade policy affecting developing countries has been part 
of or directly linked to – and in the future will require additional reform of – the EU’s 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Recent reform of the CAP has been closely linked 
to the current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the 
auspices of the WTO. 
We hope this paper will provide useful information to its readers and any feedback is 
welcome by the authors, PPLPI and the Livestock Information, Sector Analysis and 
Policy Branch (AGAL) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). 
Disclaimer 
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this publication do not 
imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any 
country, territory, city or area or its authorities or concerning the delimitations of its 
frontiers or boundaries. The opinions expressed are solely those of the author(s) and 
do not constitute in any way the official position of the FAO. 
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This study examines the political economy of policy-making concerning trade in 
livestock and livestock products (LLPs) between the European Union (EU) and 
developing countries.  The main objective is to determine and assess how relevant EU 
policy is made, including the role of key actors and forces, both domestic and 
international.  A related objective is to identify “entry points” and provide strategic 
recommendations aimed at achieving positive change. 
Two livestock commodities, beef and dairy, were selected as central to the study 
because of the high levels of EU support and the global prominence of the EU in the 
production and trade of these products.  The EU subsidizes these commodities more 
than any other LLPs, and the EU is the only country or trading bloc that provides 
export subsidies for beef. 
Criticisms of the CAP 
International organizations, academics and advocacy groups have argued that 
protectionist trade barriers, trade-distorting domestic support and export subsidies by 
many governments of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) have had very negative consequences on the economies of both developing 
and developed countries.  The CAP-related agriculture and trade policies that lead to 
overproduction and dumping of EU agricultural products are said to undermine the 
livelihoods of millions of farmers in developing countries who, at the same time, are 
also denied fair opportunities to export their own agricultural products to the EU 
market.  Pro-developing country advocacy groups have raised awareness of these 
issues and of their direct linkages to the CAP.  This report presents the findings of a 
number of relevant studies that demonstrate the negative effects of the CAP in 
developing countries in general. The report also explores specific cases – the dumping 
of beef on West African and South African markets, and the dumping of dairy products 
on Jamaica and India.  A recent study by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI) suggests that if the EU liberalized its agricultural trade the results 
would include an increase of US$42.6 billion in the net agricultural trade (exports 
minus imports) of developing countries.  In addition, there has been great concern 
over coherence between the EU’s development cooperation policies and activities and 
other policies likely to affect developing countries. This report explores some of these 
concerns and also describes efforts that have been made by some EU member states 
to promote “policy coherence.” 
EU Policy-Making and the CAP 
Three levels of analysis were identified and used to explain EU policy-making: 
•  EU member state-level politics are especially important because the member 
state agriculture ministers who collectively make the decisions about agricultural 
policy at the EU level (the CAP) are primarily accountable to their own member 
state, and to their own constituencies within their country. 
•  EU-level institutions and inter-state bargaining are central to the EU policy-
making process.  The European Commission plays a key role in setting the agenda 
for EU agricultural policy, as shown by its recent efforts to promote CAP reform.  
The Commission’s own objectives include promoting European integration and 
efficient allocation of scarce budgetary resources.  The member states are sharply 
divided on the issue of CAP reform, and inter-state bargaining in the Council of 
Agriculture Ministers has been very important in decisions regarding the CAP.  The Executive Summary 
vii   
involvement of the leaders of France and Germany concerning EU agricultural 
policy-making has been significant.  
•  The International level of analysis and trade issues are discussed below. 
A variety of interest groups operate across all three levels.  Those attempting to 
influence EU agricultural policy generally find it necessary to lobby at both the 
member state and EU levels.  Farmers groups and other agricultural interests have 
historically had the strongest influence on EU agricultural policy-making.   
Environmental concerns led to the introduction of the “second pillar” of agricultural 
support in the 1992 CAP reforms, and these concerns were further strengthened in the 
Agenda 2000 and June 2003 reforms.  Because of the BSE and other animal health and 
food safety crises, and the activities of consumer and other advocacy groups, CAP 
p o l i c i e s  w e r e  s t r e n g t h e n e d  i n  t h e  a r e a  o f  f o o d  s a f e t y .   G r o u p s  s u p p o r t i n g  a n i m a l  
welfare causes have long been active and have influenced CAP policy in this regard.  
Some consumer, environmental and pro-developing country advocacy groups have 
tried to achieve wider reform of the CAP. 
The enlargement of the EU from 15 to 25 member states in May 2004 will be very 
significant for the future of the CAP.  Concerns about how to pay for the CAP after the 
less affluent central and eastern European accession countries join the EU led to an 
agreement to limit CAP spending for the 2007–2013 period.  Based on projections, the 
general view is that enlargement will not result in additional surpluses of beef and 
dairy products. 
International Trade Issues 
The making of EU trade policy is similar to that of the CAP, with the member states 
and the Commission playing parallel roles.  The Commission, in particular General 
Directorate for Trade, coordinates policy-making and – significantly – represents the 
EU in bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations.  During the Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations there has been significant pressure on the EU to reform 
the CAP. 
Four somewhat over-lapping categories of developing countries were identified for the 
purposes of this study:  
•  South American countries that are major beef exporters (four countries) 
•  the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries as a group (77 countries) 
•  African countries exporting beef to the EU on preferential terms (six countries) 
•  the least developed countries (LDCs, 49 countries). 
Our first category of countries is among the strongest proponents of liberalizing global 
agricultural trade during the Doha Round.  The ACP countries, which already benefit 
from preferential access to the EU market, are seeking to maintain their special 
status, as do the few African countries (all ACP states) currently exporting beef to the 
EU under a preferential protocol.  The LDCs tend to share the concerns and objectives 
of the ACP countries, as the bulk of LDCs are in the ACP group. 
The study found that increased access to the EU market for beef and veal is currently 
not directly relevant to poor livestock producers in developing countries.  A major 
reason is that such producers cannot meet current sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) 
standards or European expectations regarding quality. 
The cost of compliance with SPS standards is a major problem for developing countries 
exporting agricultural products to markets that require high SPS standards.  These 
developing countries will need significant assistance in, for example, developing 
relevant infrastructure and capacity to be able to certify that their products meet 
international standards. Executive Summary 
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Forces for and against CAP Reform 
The most important force driving reform of the CAP has been multilateral trade 
negotiations.  The Doha Round of agricultural trade talks is currently playing this role.  
To strengthen its negotiating position in the agricultural talks at the September 2003 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting in Cancun, in June 2003 the EU 
member states reached agreement on CAP reform.  Ranking second as a driving force 
for CAP reform are budgetary pressures created by the (a) need to integrate the much 
less efficient agriculture sectors of the ten accession countries that will join the EU in 
2004 and (b) the difficulty of sustaining the CAP in general.  Environmental concerns 
have produced changes in EU agricultural policy, as have the concerns and efforts of 
groups supporting animal welfare.  The activities of consumers and pro-developing 
country advocates has increased awareness of certain issues in recent years but has 
not had much influence in changing agricultur a l  p o li cy  e xcep t  i n t he a re a  o f fo o d 
safety.  The situation is changing in Europe, as pressures from various groups to 
reform EU agricultural policy have been mounting.  For example, the influence of food 
retailers, processors and others (particularly as a result of increased vertical 
integration along the food processing chain from farmer to consumer) is strengthening 
the pro-reform constituency.  
Although the number of European farmers has been steadily declining, the continued 
strength of farmers’ organizations and other agricultural interests has so far served as 
a bulwark against reform of the CAP.  These interests have dominated EU agricultural 
policy-making for decades, and they are particularly important in the internal politics 
of France.  For many years France, and EU member states sharing similar goals, have 
used EU-level institutions and inter-state bargaining to successfully defend the CAP. 
Recommendations 
Reforming both the CAP and multilateral trade rules could significantly improve the 
prospects of poor developing country-livestock producers.  The analysis presented in 
this report suggests a number of entry points for making EU policy more responsive to 
the problem of poverty reduction in developing countries in general and for livestock-
dependent poor in particular.  The report discusses strategic entry points at the level 
of the (a) international trading system, (b) EU member state and (c) the European 
Union itself.  Some of the more important recommendations are highlighted below. 
The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations is critical as it is the most 
important force driving CAP reform and it provides the best opportunity to achieve a 
global trading system that has fairer rules for developing countries.  Multilateral trade 
negotiations are also the most effective way for developing countries to have 
influence on EU policy-making; without such influence, developing-country interests 
will not receive adequate consideration.  I t  i s  c l e a r ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h a t  m o s t  p o o r  
developing countries need considerable assistance to more effectively determine their 
own best trade-related interests and then to promote them.  Two general 
recommendations follow from this: (a) if progress is to be made in the ongoing 
multilateral trade negotiations involving developing countries, better targeted and 
more effective technical assistance is required: and (b) poor countries should be 
assisted to develop fora to allow them to better learn of each other’s interests and to 
enable them to build productive alliances. 
The present study found little solid information regarding the effects of the CAP in 
developing countries.  To help fill this information gap it is recommended that 
relevant information on the effects of the EU’s subsidized exports of milk powder in 
selected developing countries be collected and analysed, focusing on whether and 
how such exports undermine livelihoods and hinder efforts to reduce poverty (and, if 
yes, the key consequences). Executive Summary 
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SPS standards are becoming increasingly important in regard to market access.  Many 
poor LLP producers are unable to access the EU market because they cannot meet the 
high SPS standards.  In addition, producers who have been supplying developing 
country markets may lose access to these markets if international-level SPS standards 
are applied.  We recommend studies that focus on whether and how (and, if yes, the 
results) the SPS standards prevent poor producers from accessing these markets.   
Additional attention needs to be focused on developing and implementing appropriate 
forms of: (a) representation by developing countries in the international organizations 
that determine and supervise SPS standards: and (b) representation of poor livestock 
producers on the bodies that determine and supervise national SPS policy in 
developing countries. 
The experiences of interest groups suggest entry points for those wishing to influence 
EU policy.  As both farmers’ organizations and food and beverage industry interests 
have demonstrated, it can pay off to develop long-term relationships with Commission 
officials and key member-state politicians.  While building such relationships would be 
useful to advocacy groups as well, it is unlikely that they have the same kind of 
opportunities.  Advocacy groups have been successful at raising awareness of their 
concerns among the public, however, and it is through public pressure that they have 
had their greatest influence on key decision-makers.  The successes of environmental 
and animal rights advocates in influencing CAP reform may be relevant to pro-
developing country advocacy groups, although there appears to be more concern 
within Europe for environmental issues (and animal rights issues in parts of Europe) 
than for the problems of developing countries.  For those involved in advocacy efforts, 
long-term strategies focused on raising public awareness may have the best pay-offs. 
On a more general note, it would be useful for international organizations to publicize 
more widely the findings of key research on relevant policy issues as opinion pieces in 
leading newspapers, as well as to send policy briefs to the staffs of senior politicians 
and to officials of EU member states, the Commission, members of the European 




This study examines the political economy of policy-making concerning trade in 
livestock and livestock products (LLPs) between the European Union (EU) and 
developing countries.  The main objective is to determine and assess how relevant EU 
policy is made, including the role of key actors and forces, both domestic and 
international.  A related objective is to identify “entry points” and provide strategic 
recommendations for achieving positive change.  The Pro-Poor Livestock Policy 
Initiative (PPLPI) of FAO is working to learn more about how livestock can play a 
greater role in reducing poverty in developing countries.  The present study is part of 
the PPLPI effort to identify significant political and institutional factors and processes 
that currently hinder or prevent the poor in developing countries from taking greater 
advantage of opportunities to benefit from livestock. 
The Focus on Beef and Dairy 
Table 1:  Country Comparisons in Average Animal Production (1997-2001). 
Beef & veal  Mutton & lamb  Pig meat  Poultry meat 
Country  1,000 mt  Country  1,000 mt  Country  1,000 mt  Country  1,000 mt 
USA 12,091  China 1,597  China 41,866  USA 16,790 
EU (15)  7,502  EU (15)  1,017  EU (15)  17,880  China 12,100 
Brazil 6,966  Australia 653  USA 8,804  EU (15)  8,875 
China 5,285  New Zealand  536  Brazil 2,699  Brazil 6,672 
Argentina 2,678  Iran 329  Poland 1,978  Mexico 1,987 
            
Milk 
(cattle & buffalo)  Butter  SMP  WMP 
Country  1,000 mt  Country  1,000 mt  Country  1,000 mt  Country  1,000 mt 
EU (15)  122,459  EU (15)  1,790  EU (15)  1,064  EU (15)  788 
India 79,950  USA 554  USA 601  New Zealand  423 
USA 75,861  New Zealand  349  Russian Fed.  258  Brazil 263 
Russian 
Fed.  32,500  Russian Fed.  273  Australia 238  Argentina 196 
Pakistan 25,678  Poland 172  New Zealand  196  Australia 160 
Source: FAOSTAT 2004 
Note: No data updated for China dairy products. 
 
Two livestock commodities, beef and dairy, were selected as central to the study.
1  
The EU is a prodigious producer of LLPs, and it plays a major role in international 
trade in LLPs (as demonstrated in this report).  From 1997-2001 the EU was the 
world’s largest producer of milk, butter, skimmed milk powder and whole milk 
                                                 
1 Many factors are relevant to the present study.  Given the wide range of issues and large number of organizations 
concerned, as well as the limited resources available, it was necessary to narrow the focus of the study.  The aim of the 
research was to identify and examine key issues, not delve into details. 1. Introduction 
2   
Although the EU is a major producer and exporter of other LLPs as well (including pig 
meat, poultry meat and eggs), it provides far greater support to beef and dairy.  For 
example, in 2001 beef and veal received over 60% of the EU’s support to the livestock 
sector, while dairy received about 20%.  Over half of EU support to dairy is in the form 
of export refunds.  While sheep and goat meat are supported with about 15% of total 
EU support to LLPs, there are no export refunds.  A very small proportion of EU 
support in the livestock sector goes to pig meat, eggs and poultry meat, most of it as 
export refunds. (See Annex 6 Table: Breakdown of expenditure (financial year 2001) 
by sector according to the economic nature of the measures.) 
EU subsidies and trade barriers have been the subject of intense criticism by some EU 
member states, developed and developing country trading partners, international 
organizations, academics, advocacy non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
others.  The EU is said to export skimmed milk powder at half the cost of production 
(Oxfam 2002b) and to provide each dairy cow with more than US$2 in support every 
day – an amount greater than the income of half the world’s human population (Cafod 
2002, Oxfam 2002d).  The EU is the only trading bloc that provides export subsidies for 
beef, and it is reported to provide the highest level of support to its beef producers of 
any trading block or country in the world (MLA 2002, MLA 2003). 
Negative Impact of Industrialized Countries’ Agricultural Policies 
Publications by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
the World Bank (WB), the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and 
others argue that protectionist trade barriers, domestic support and export subsidies 
have very negative consequences on both developing and developed countries.  A WB 
policy research report states that a conservative estimate of the total annual impact 
of industrial country barriers on developing countries is likely to be more than US$100 
billion (WB 2002).  The OECD reported that in 2001 OECD countries provided support 
to their agricultural sectors totalling US$311 billion, or 1.3% of gross domestic product 
(GDP).  This amount is equivalent to twice the value of developing country agricultural 
exports, and it is six times the value of official development assistance.  The costs are 
borne by domestic consumers and taxpayers and by potential exporters in other 
countries that lose income.
2  Three-quarters of the transfers are provided as support 
to farmers, accounting for one-third of their gross receipts, with general expenditures 
on items such as research, marketing and infrastructure accounting for the rest.  The 
level of support to producers, as captured by the Producer Support Estimate, varies 
widely across countries and commodities.  The EU, Japan and the United States 
collectively account for around 80% of all support.  Rice, sugar and milk are the most 
supported commodities, with transfers to producers exceeding 50% of gross receipts 
for these products (OECD 2002, OECD 2003a). 
IFPRI recently estimated the immediate damage to the economies of the world’s poor 
countries by simulating, based on a computer model of the world economy, the 
elimination of industrialized countries’ current relevant policies.  According to this 
study, protectionism and subsidies by industrialized nations cost developing countries 
around US$24 billion annually in lost agricultural and agro-industrial income.  Trade-
distorting measures also displace more than US$40 billion of net agricultural exports 
from developing countries per year.  Net agricultural trade of developing countries 
would triple if the industrialized world eliminated its agricultural protectionism and 
subsidies (IFPRI 2003a,b).  A recent WB report pointed out that agricultural subsidies 
in OECD countries now amount to US$330 billion, of which about US$250 billion goes 
d i r e c t l y  t o  p r o d u c e r s .   T h e  e f f e c t  i s  t o  stimulate overproduction in high-cost rich 
countries and shut out potentially more competitive products from poor countries 
(WB, 2003). 
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Utility of a Political Economy Approach 
Why do developed countries spend so much to support their own agricultural sectors 
and thereby distort global agricultural trade when economic theory and studies by 
various international organizations, and many others, assert that liberalizing 
international trade should bring enormous economic benefits to both developed and 
developing countries?  One key reason is that political factors dominate relevant 
decision-making.  The stubborn perseverance of these factors demonstrates the need 
for a political economy approach to better understand issues relating to policy-making 
in regard to LLP trade between the EU and developing countries. 
The present study examines the political economy of relevant LLP trade-related issues 
at four levels: (a) the EU member state; (b) the EU itself; (c) the international trading 
system; and (d) developing countries.
3  Several issues cross, or are relevant to, the 
different levels of analysis.  There is a very wide range of actors involved in the issues 
covered in this study.  It is useful to note that some actors are found at more than one 
level.  For example, interest and advocacy groups are found at all four levels.  The 
main actors include: 
•  At the EU member state level: ministries of agriculture, foreign affairs (including 
development assistance) and trade; political parties; livestock producers; farmers’ 
groups and unions; research units; and animal welfare, environmental and other 
advocacy groups.   
•  At the EU level: the EU Council of Ministers (particularly Agriculture); the European 
Council (as well as individual heads of state); the European Commission 
(particularly the Directorates General of Agriculture, Trade, and Health); 
consumers; producers; and environmental, developing country and other interest 
and advocacy groups.   
•  At the level of the international trading system: the World Trade Organization 
(WTO); EU; the United States; Cairns Group; Group of 21; United Nations agencies 
and two standard-setting organizations, the Office International des Epizooties 
(OIE) and Codex Alimentarius; and various interest and advocacy groups. 
•  At the developing-country level: the Group of 21; African, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) countries; representatives of individual developing countries at the Doha 
Round of multilateral trade negotiations; developing country representatives at the 
OIE and Codex Alimentarius; and livestock producers, including both large-scale 
and poor producers. 
EU policies dealing with the production of and trade in LLPs are part of, or closely 
linked to, the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  In addition, the policies are 
regulated by the WTO’s multilateral trade rules, particularly the Agreement on 
Agriculture.  It is, of course, not possible for an individual EU member state to make 
its own agricultural or trade policy in regard to LLPs or any other product.  To change 
EU LLP policy therefore requires reforming CAP policy, and such reform is linked to 
multilateral trade rules.  Two very important processes affecting EU agricultural 
policy-making were taking place during the period of research for this study.  Both 
processes were evolving, with new and sometimes surprising developments.  One 
process involved strenuous efforts to reform the CAP that led to the agreement 
reached by the agriculture ministers of the EU’s 15 member states in June 2003.  The 
second process involves the ongoing Doha Round of WTO agricultural trade talks that 
stalled with the collapse of the Cancun ministerial meeting in September 2003.  
Both CAP reform and the Doha Round of multilateral agricultural negotiations provide 
critical opportunities to change current EU policies and practices in a manner that 
might benefit livestock producers in developing countries. The present report explains 
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how CAP policies are made, and it examines the range of factors and pressures for and 
against reform.  The report also explains how CAP reform and the Doha Round of trade 
negotiations are closely inter-linked, and it discusses whether poor livestock producers 
in developing countries might benefit from changes to the CAP and/or global trade 
rules.   
5 
2. CRITICISM OF THE CAP 
This chapter presents criticism from economists, advocacy groups and the European 
Commission itself concerning negative international effects of the EU’s CAP, 
particularly in regard to developing countries.  It begins with the results of two 
simulation studies regarding global economic effects of the CAP. The studies are 
followed by an elaboration of the position of advocacy NGOs that the CAP undermines 
the livelihoods of millions of farmers in developing countries.  The final section of this 
chapter deals with allegations that the CAP prevents the “coherence” of the EU’s 
agricultural, development and trade policies. 
It is widely recognized that the CAP protects EU farmers from external competition, a 
result of the fact that when the CAP was established over 40 years ago a primary focus 
was internal price support to promote food self-sufficiency within the member states.  
Protection is achieved by controlling market access (through import tariffs and other 
means) and by providing domestic support as well as export subsidies.  As a result, the 
prices EU agricultural producers receive tend to be well above international levels.  
EU producer prices are stabilized relative to international prices, and EU consumers 
and taxpayers pay most of the costs. The high prices encourage farmers to increase 
production, while the high consumer prices discourage consumption.  The combination 
of the various factors leads to surplus production.  The EU subsidizes the export of 
some agricultural commodities because otherwise surplus production would not be 
internationally competitive.  There are two general ways in which the CAP can 
negatively affect agricultural producers and exporters in other countries: (a) lowering 
international prices for raw agricultural products; and (b) dumping into specific 
markets, thereby undercutting local producers.
4  
Agricultural Policies of Industrialized Countries and Damage to the 
Economies of Developing Countries – A Simulation Study 
As mentioned in the first chapter, a number of studies have produced estimates of 
how the economies of developing countries have been harmed by the agricultural and 
trade policies of industrialized countries.  The simulation study of the world economy 
by IFPRI estimated that Latin American and Caribbean countries lose about US$8.3 
billion in annual income from agriculture, developing countries in Asia lose some 
US$6.6 billion, and sub-Saharan Africa loses nearly US$2 billion.  The EU’s trade-
distorting policies and measures are reported to cause more than half of the US$40 
billion of net agricultural exports foregone per year by developing countries.  Because 
of regional trade relationships, EU policies have a greater impact on Africa than on 
Asia or Latin America.  If agricultural trade-distorting policies were eliminated 
worldwide, almost 70% of the increase in value of exports from sub-Saharan Africa 
would come from liberalization by the EU.  For Latin America and the Caribbean, 
more than 50% of the expansion of exports from global liberalization would come from 
changes in EU policies (IFPRI 2003b). 
The IFPRI study also estimated: (a) the potential impact of changes in industrialized 
countries’ agricultural trade policies on developing countries, in terms of developing 
country net agricultural trade (exports minus imports); and (b) the annual changes in 
incomes going to agriculture and agro-industrial production.  Results of the simulation 
study are presented in Table 2.  The table shows that the role of EU trade protection 
and trade distortion is significant, as is that of the US and Japan. 
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Table 2:  Potential Impact on Developing Countries of Changes in Industrialized Countries’ 
Agricultural Trade Policies.  
Developing Country Net Agricultural Trade 
(Exports minus Imports, in Billions of Dollars) 
  Changes in Agricultural Trade Policies By 
Region  1997 Net 
Trade 
Levels 







Sub-Saharan Africa  7.4  8.1  9.6  7.6  10.7  45% 
Asia  12.3 15.6 15.6 15.7 22.8 85% 
Latin America and 
Caribbean  31.7 37.1 39.3 32.5 46.4 47% 
Other Developing 
Countries **  (31.0)*** (29.4)  (21.9)  (30.1) (19.1) (38%) 
All Developing Countries  20.4  31.4  42.6  25.7  60.8  198% 
 
Annual Changes in Incomes 
Going to Primary Agriculture and Agro-industrial Production 
(increases in Million Dollars) 
Changes in Agricultural Trade Policies By 
Region 




Sub-Saharan Africa  455  1,290  150  1,945 
Asia  2,186 2,099 2,346 6,624 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean  2,896 4,480  607 8,258 
Other Developing 
Countries **  1,148 5,069  339 6,659 
All Developing Countries  6,684  12,936  3,442  23,486 
Source:  IFPRI, 2003 
* Simulations for the EU, US, and Japan (and Korea) consider each one of these countries/regions only, one at a 
time.  Simulations for all industrialized countries include those three countries/regions at the same time, plus 
others, such as Canada and Australia.  Because of the complexities of agricultural trade and countries’ trading 
practices, the effects of liberalization will change depending on which markets are being liberalized.   
Consequently, individual scenarios depicted in the model simulations should not necessarily add up to the total 
when all industrialized countries liberalize their markets.  The simulations consider the full elimination of 
protection, trade-distorting domestic subsidies, and export subsidies. 
** Other Developing Countries includes transition economies. 
*** Indicates negative 2. Criticism of the CAP 
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Global Economic Effects if the CAP Were Abolished – A Simulation 
Study 
What might be the global economic effects if the CAP were abolished?  A simulation 
study by Borrell and Hubbard published in 2000 examined this issue.  The model used 
was “a mathematical representation of the world’s most important economies, all 
linked and interacting globally through trade.”  The model was aggregated into seven 
regions and ten sectors. 
The simulation study estimated the EU production of milk products was 51.5% higher 
and meat products 17.6% higher than they would have been without the CAP.   
Production of non-grain crops would have increased the most (809%), with grains 
increasing by the same proportion as milk products.  The enlargement
5 of the EU 
agriculture sector is found to have been at the cost of all other sectors of the 
economy.  The increased agricultural production has resulted in huge structural 
surpluses within the EU that were dumped on world markets.  The increases in exports 
estimated by the simulation study are extremely high, as without the CAP the EU 
would not export these products.  Instead, the EU would significantly increase imports 
of agricultural products.  The increase in the export of milk products (as well as of 
grains and non-grain crops) is reported as 9 900%, and of meat products 4 900%.  The 
dumping of EU agricultural exports on world markets and reduced import demand has 
in some cases lowered world prices substantially.  It has also led non-EU agricultural 
exporters to reduce production.   
Table 3:  Dairy and Meat: Output and Export Reductions. 
Estimated Output Reductions (%)  Export Reductions (%)   
Milk 
products  Livestock  Meat  Milk 
products  Livestock  Meat 
Rest of the world*  47.4  9.1  5.7  91.5  67.8  58.5 
Australia and New 
Zealand  51.2   16.7  72.1    31.5 
*includes developing countries minus Latin America 
 
The authors of the simulation study suggest that the CAP has had a profound influence 
on the production and trade of many agricultural products in many countries, and that 
the CAP has caused structural changes in the economies of many countries.  They 
conclude that the CAP has been for most of the last 30 years “a major source of 
disruption and instability on global agricultural markets” (Borrell and Hubbard 2000). 
The CAP’s Impact on Developing Countries – the Position of Advocacy 
NGOs 
Numerous European development and advocacy NGOs have criticized the CAP because 
of what they describe as its negative effects on developing countries.  The 
perspectives of these NGOs have often been based on their own experiences, as well 
as those of their partner organizations, in developing countries.  Some of the NGOs 
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have established groups to strengthen their advocacy efforts.  One such group, 
Eurostep, comprises more than 20 NGOs
6 from 15 European countries “working for 
justice and equal opportunities, North and South.”  Based in Brussels, Eurostep was 
founded in 1990 to coordinate its members’ policy work at the European level 
(Eurostep 1993; 1999a,b).  The Trade Justice Movement is another group of NGOs and 
includes ActionAid, Cafod and Oxfam. These organizations are working together in 
efforts to fundamentally change what they describe as the unjust rules and 
institutions that govern international trade, so that “trade is made to work for all” 
(Cafod 2002; see also ActionAid 2002).
7 
Oxfam has been particularly active recently with its Make Trade Fair campaign.  It has 
set up an informative website and produced a number of reports.  The core report is 
the lengthy Rigged Rules and Double Standards: trade, globalisation and the fight 
against poverty (Oxfam 2002a).  There are also a number of shorter reports on specific 
topics aimed at a more general audience (see, for example, Oxfam 2002b,c, d).   
Oxfam’s views on CAP reform and related trade issues are frequently reported in the 
British press.  The Make Trade Fair campaign also works with schools, providing 
teachers with lesson plans and ideas for instructing school children.
8 
A report by Cafod, a development and advocacy NGO based in the UK, entitled 
“Dumping on the Poor” has been widely referred to and presents views presumably 
representative of the Trade Justice Movement.
9   The report states that the EU’s CAP 
is enormously expensive and enormously damaging.  A typical UK family of four pays 
16 pounds a week in taxes and higher food prices to support an agricultural system 
with a disastrous track record of overproduction, environmental degradation and food 
safety scares.  The CAP also undermines the livelihoods of millions of farmers in 
developing countries by dumping cheap produce in their markets and denying them 
export opportunities to the EU market.  The CAP, as well as subsidies and 
protectionism on the part of other major economic powers such as the US, “constitute 
a roadblock on the path to development for dozens of the world’s poorest nations.”  
The present system prevents these countries from building on their agricultural 
potential to improve the lives of their poorest people and communities.  When 
developing-country farmers do achieve the capacity to export, frequently they find EU 
markets closed to them by high tariffs and other obstacles.  In other markets, they 
face competition from subsidized European exports.  Developing-country farmers and 
governments see the CAP, along with the US Farm Bill, as the worst example of double 
standards, summed up as “you liberalize, we subsidize” (Cafod 2002). 
Box 1:  EU Beef Exports – the Case of West Africa. 
Between 1984 and 1991 exports of EU beef to coastal West Africa increased sevenfold 
to 54 000 tons.  Most of the meat was low-grade “capas:” frozen or chilled boneless 
side meat with high fat content.  In Cote d’Ivoire, the biggest market for beef at the 
time, imports of frozen and chilled beef (nearly all from the EU) jumped from 18% of 
beef consumption in 1984 to 44% in 1990.  EU export support for this beef was two ECU 
per kilo in the early 1990s, four times the reported value of the beef itself!  In 1991 
                                                 
6 The members of Eurostep (European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People): Action Aid, UK; CNCD, Belgium; 
Concern Worldwide, Ireland; Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, Germany; Forum Syd, Sweden; Freres des hommes, France; 
Helinas, Greece; Hivos, Netherlands; Ibis, Denmark; Intermon, Spain; Kepa, Finland; Mani Tese, Italy; Mellemfolkeligt 
Samvirke, Denmark; Movimondo, Italy; NCOS, Belgium; Norwegian People’s Aid, Norway; Novib, Netherlands; Oikos, 
Portugal; Oxfam GB; Oxfam Ireland; Swiss Coalition of Development Organisations, Switzerland; Terre des hommes, 
Germany; Terre des hommes, France. 
7  The members of the Trade Justice Movement: Cafod, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Friends of the Earth, the Fairtrade Foundation, 
SCIAF, ActionAid, People and Planet, Save the Children Fund, and the World Development Movement. 
8 See the Oxfam website: www.maketradefair.com  
9 For information on the Trade Justice Campaign:  www.cafod.org.uk  2. Criticism of the CAP 
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the EU reportedly provided 100 million ECU to European companies to export EU beef 
valued at 27 million ECU to West Africa.  France was the leading supplier of EU beef to 
West Africa in 1991 (40% of the total), followed by the Netherlands (20%), Germany 
(10%), Denmark (10%), Spain (8%) and Italy (8%) (Eurostep 1993). 
The EU beef was sold in West Africa at one-third to two-thirds below the price of local 
fresh beef.  Within the EU itself, beef was far more expensive than EU beef sold in 
West Af rican  market s.  The very low price s at wh ich beef w as sold in We st Afr ica  
created a major problem for the normal suppli e r s  o f  b e e f  t o  c o a s t a l  W e s t  A f r i c a n  
countries as these suppliers were undersold.  For decades livestock producers in 
Sahelian countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic) had 
provided live cattle for beef consumption in coastal West African countries stretching 
from Cameroon to Senegal.  This pattern continued until the amount of low-cost EU 
beef rapidly increased in the mid-1980s.  By the late 1980s, the Club du Sahel 
estimated that regional cattle trade had dropped by 30% from the early part of the 
decade.  In Cote d’Ivoire the share of beef from the Sahel in the country’s total beef 
supply dropped from more than two-thirds in 1975 to 28% in 1990. 
The EU significantly reduced subsidies for beef exported to West Africa in 1993-1994.  
In January 1994 the CFA was devalued by half and EU exports to West Africa dropped 
significantly (Eurostep 1993, 1999a).  On the basis of the available information, it is 
not possible to determine the relative influence of the role of the advocacy groups, 
devaluation of the CFA or other factors in the significant decline in subsidized EU beef 
exports to West Africa.   
The EU currently exports very little beef to West Africa. The Commission now says 
that, although it still has export subsidies for beef, it no longer provides export 
refunds for low-quality beef products. Additionally, present and future trends for the 
2 0 0 3 - 2 0 1 0  p e r i o d  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  E U  w i l l  p r o d u c e  l e s s  t h a n  i t  c o n s u m e s  ( s e e  D G  
Agriculture 2003d). These factors point to a reduced likelihood for future EU dumping 
of beef in West and South Africa. Nevertheless, there remains concern in Africa that if 
conditions change in the future, the EU could resume subsidizing the export of low-
grade beef and thereby again significantly disrupt existing production and marketing 
systems. 
Box 2:  EU Beef Exports – the Case of South Africa. 
At about the same time as the EU reduced its dumping of beef in West Africa, it found 
a new market for low-quality beef in South Africa.  In September 1993 the South 
African government replaced quantitative restrictions on beef imports with a tariff.  
EU beef exporters used export refunds to greatly increase the amount of beef shipped 
to South Africa.  Between 1993 and1995 exports of EU beef to South Africa increased 
from 6 600 tons to nearly 46 000 tons.  During this period there was a significant 
increase in EU expenditure for export refunds for beef in general (Eurostep 1999a, 
Goodison).
10  
The EU beef exported to South Africa in the 1993-1996 period was primarily low-
quality, frozen de-boned “C grade” meat intended for use in industrial production or 
institutions. EU exporters made most of their profit from the export refund, not the 
price of the beef itself.  Export refunds rose from about 1.5 times the Free on Board 
price of the beef in 1993-1995 to 2.5 times the price of the beef in 1996.  In spite of a 
28% devaluation of the Rand between January 1994 and December 1996, EU beef was 
imported at prices substantially below the prevailing wholesale prices of beef. 
In regard to the impact the dumping of EU beef had on local producers, South Africa 
has been the major market for Namibian beef exports since the 1950s. Reportedly 
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because of the drop in prices, in 1996 there was a 40% reduction in livestock marketed 
in the Northern Communal Areas (NCA) of Namibia in spite of severe drought 
conditions.  An estimated 95% of the NCA population is dependent on livestock 
production, and livestock are the principal source of cash income.  The Namibians 
affected by the subsidized exports of EU beef to South Africa included the poorest 
sections of the population.  The large-scale imports of low grade EU beef at below 
local wholesale prices in South Africa are reported to have undermined the NCA 
livestock development project that aimed to integrate livestock raising in northern 
Namibia into national and regional markets. 
The bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) crisis in Europe had significant financial 
impact on the EU budget, and by 1999 export refunds for beef going to South Africa 
were reduced by 70%, leading to a 76% drop in exports from the 1995 peak.  It is 
significant that the BSE livestock health crisis in EU countries played a key role in 
drastically reducing the amount of export refunds and the amount of beef exported to 
South Africa. 
 
In spite of production quotas introduced in 1984, the EU consistently produces more 
dairy products than needed for domestic consumption.  The EU is the world’s largest 
exporter of skimmed milk powder, and Oxfam estimates that the EU exports it at 
around one-half the costs of production.  Export subsidies in the dairy sector in recent 
years have accounted for € 1.5 billion, according to Oxfam, 50% of EU expenditure in 
the sector.  The direct beneficiaries of the export subsidies are not the milk producers 
but the dairy processing and trading companies that export the products.  These 
companies receive more than € one billion a year in export subsidies alone. 
Box 3:  EU Dairy Exports – the Case of Jamaica. 
Jamaica is frequently identified as a developing country whose domestic dairy industry 
has been seriously harmed by the import of subsidized EU dairy products.  It is 
reported that in 1992 Jamaican import tariffs on milk powder were reduced while a 
parallel subsidy for local dairy farming was abolished as a result of conditions attached 
to a structural adjustment loan negotiated with the WB.  One result has been a nearly 
fourfold increase in the import of milk solids since 1992, with the EU as the source of 
two-thirds of the imported powdered milk.  Eurostep estimated in 1999 that the EU 
annually spent € 4 million on subsidized milk powder exported to Jamaica.  With cheap 
imported milk powder readily available, Jamaican food companies have shunned 
Jamaican fresh milk.   Before 1992 small-scale producers in rural areas had been part 
of and benefited from the national dairy industry, aided by infrastructure and a system 
that enabled milk companies  (with government assistance) to collect, process and sell 
milk. By buying cheap subsidized milk powder from the EU and US, large milk 
processors and wholesalers have been able to reduce the price they pay local farmers 
for their milk (Cafod 2002, Eurostep 1999a and b, UNDP 2003, Oxfam 2002d). 
Under pressure from the Jamaican dairy industry, in 1996 the government raised tariffs 
on milk powder from 30% to 50%.  This has not been effective as there is a tariff of 
only 5% for importers who can classify themselves as “manufacturers.” This category is 
loosely defined.  In addition to major milk companies in Jamaica, this category also 
includes a new group of importers who emerged to profit from the advantageous 
situation.  Jamaica is reportedly reluctant to take trade measures against the EU 
because it depends on Europe for preferential access for its exports of bananas and 
sugar (Cafod 2002). 2. Criticism of the CAP 
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Box 4:  EU Dairy Exports – the Case of India. 
The EU and other international donors supported Operation Flood, which played a key 
role in the successful development of the Indian dairy industry.  Between 1970 and 
2000, India’s annual milk production increased fourfold.  India is currently the world’s 
largest milk producer, with 13% of global production, and milk is now the single largest 
agricultural commodity produced in the country.  More than 75% of those involved in 
dairy farming are smallholders or landless, many of them women.  India is now self-
sufficient in milk production and has recently begun to develop small quantities of 
dairy exports.  The country’s efforts to increase exports to Bangladesh and the Middle 
East, however, are reported to confront heavily subsidized, lower priced exports from 
the EU.  Further, the Indian dairy industry has complained that local milk producers 
are unable to compete with imports of subsidized EU butter and milk powder (Oxfam 
2002d; see also Sharma and Gulati 2003). 
 
There is some controversy regarding the allegations that the EU has dumped, and 
continues to dump, subsidized exports of dairy products in developing countries, 
thereby undermining local dairy production systems and livelihoods.  The position of 
Oxfam, Cafod and other advocacy groups that are engaged in a campaign against the 
dumping of dairy products in developing countries has been presented. On the other 
hand, some individuals interviewed in the course of the research raised questions 
about the accuracy of the advocacy groups’ claims, saying that some of the 
information presented was incomplete or inaccurate.  It needs to be noted that some 
of those questioning the accuracy of the advocacy groups evidence share with the 
groups the objective of fair trade for developing countries.  A key conclusion from this 
controversy is that the issues involved are complicated and very contextual, and that 
careful field research is required to fully understand the interrelated factors. 
The authors of the present report conclude that there is convincing evidence that the 
EU has dumped subsidized exports of dairy products: (1) on world markets, thereby 
reducing world prices; and (2) in developing countries, particularly skimmed milk 
powder.  Such dumping in developing countries could undermine local dairy 
production and marketing systems, thereby reducing or denying local livestock 
keepers access to local markets.  These processes could certainly undermine 
livelihoods and existing dairy industries, as well as efforts to develop and improve 
these industries. 
Table 5 shows that, according to European Commission statistics, only a tiny 
percentage (0.1%) of the world’s total fresh milk production is traded.  However, 
nearly half (48.2%) of world production of milk powder is traded, and this is the dairy 
commodity of concern in this controversy.  In addition, the EU dominates global trade 
in milk powder with nearly one-third (29.2%) of the net share (European Commission 
2003).  As mentioned earlier in the report, the EU supports its dairy industry primarily 
through the use of export refunds.  The European Court of Auditors (ECA, 2003) 
recently found that for certain dairy products “there were a significant number of 
occasions when…the EU [internal market] price, after deducting refunds, was lower 
than the world price.”  That is, there were times when the EU was supporting its 
exports for sale at below-world market prices.  The ECA also found “no coherent link” 
between the export refund rate that was set and market prices.  The Commission’s 
response to the ECA’s report argued that while it is not their policy to defend their 
market share in a particular country they will pursue “an active export policy” to 
maintain their place in certain markets. 
The logic of the advocacy groups’ argument that by dumping dairy products in 
developing countries the EU is undermining local production and marketing systems is 2. Criticism of the CAP 
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compelling, and there is strong evidence that the EU has dumped dairy products.  It is 
highly relevant that what may seem to be small quantities on a global scale might well 
be very important in a small developing-country market with a fledgling dairy 
industry.  In addition, some of the criticism of the EU policies and practices comes 
from the advocacy groups’ counterparts in developing countries who are very familiar 
with conditions on the ground.  But others argue that by dumping dairy products in 
developing countries the EU is making nutritional benefits available to consumers, 
especially in urban areas, at low prices where there are only rudimentary local dairy 
production and marketing systems.  In this controversy, so far little attention has been 
paid to the fact that establishing and sustaining effective dairy production and 
marketing systems in developing countries that really benefit poor producers has been 
elusive.  Kenya is a clear example in Africa, and India’s success was discussed above.  
The strongest evidence supporting the advocacy groups’ position is from Jamaica (see 
Box 3).  But the dairy problems of Jamaica have been repeated so often that some 
interviewed wondered what other evidence exists.  The evidence provided by 
advocacy groups (Oxfam 2002d, Eurostep 1999a) that dumping occurred in other 
developing countries was not strong, and some individuals with whom the issues were 
discussed questioned key aspects of specific cases reported in these studies.  On the 
other hand, country case studies conducted under the present University of California, 
Berkeley, research project for FAO did show a negative impact from EU milk powder 
on domestic fresh milk production in Senegal and Vietnam.  Clearly, this is an issue 
that merits further study. 
The CAP and Development Cooperation Policy 
Under article 130 of the Amsterdam Treaty and article C of the Union Treaty, the EU 
is committed to ensuring coherence between its development cooperation policies and 
activities and other policies likely to affect developing countries (Eurostep 1999a).  
There have been numerous allegations that the CAP has prevented policy coherence 
by interfering with the EU’s own efforts to promote development cooperation 
affecting developing countries.  The CAP has even more often been charged with 
interfering with the development activities of other donor agencies and NGOs.  A lack 
of policy coherence is evident in some of the cases described above. 
The heavily subsidized exports of EU beef to both West and South Africa were 
inconsistent with previous and then on-going livestock development activities of the 
EU itself and of other donors in those parts of Africa.  In West Africa, since at least 
the 1970s there has been a great deal of donor support for livestock development 
activities, including beef production.  Various European bilateral development 
agencies (Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands), USAID, the WB and numerous 
NGOs have been involved.  The EU itself invested relatively large sums to support beef 
production in several West African countries.  The subsidized exports of EU beef 
undermined these efforts, including those aimed at helping poor livestock producers in 
the Sahel and other West African countries (Eurostep 1999, DG Development 2000).  In 
Southern Africa, for example, the EU invested 3.75 million ECU in a livestock 
development project in the Northern Communal Areas of Namibia aimed at increasing 
cash incomes of cattle owners and reducing pressure on the land.  A key objective was 
to open up opportunities for cattle and meat from these areas to be marketed in 
South Africa.  The large-scale imports by South Africa of low-grade EU beef at below 
local wholesale prices are reported to have undermined the project. 
The European Commission itself has acknowledged “incoherence” between 
fundamental mechanisms of the CAP and the EC’s development cooperation policy.  
The main issues are: (a) subsidies granted by the European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) to exports of agri-food products to third countries; and (b) 
measures aimed at providing EU-produced agri-food products a competitive edge 2. Criticism of the CAP 
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against imported products on the domestic EU market.  A European Commission report 
pointed out that it was widely recognized that the CAP has three major distorting 
effects on livestock production in developing countries: (1) subsidized exports of 
animal products undercut the competitiveness of local animal production; (2) 
subsidized exports of crop by-products provide cheap animal feed, favoring peri-urban 
over rural livestock production and competing with domestically produced animal 
feed; and (3) crop by-products from some developing countries are exported to the EU 
where they fetch a higher price as animal feed than domestically.  This is likely to 
negatively affect livestock production in developing countries (DG Development 2000).  
At the May 2002 Council of Ministers of Development Cooperation, some ministers 
argued that EU agricultural policy under a reformed CAP must be consistent with EU 
development policy goals of poverty reduction and sustainable development in 
developing countries.  This effort by ministers of some member states to promote 
coherence between the CAP and development cooperation policy was reportedly 
blocked (Cafod 2002).  Since that time, the ministers of development cooperation 
have lost their own council of ministers.  Instead, issues dealing with development 
cooperation are now decided at the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.  Those 
interviewed about this topic suggested that the change had two consequences.  While 
it may be difficult for development cooperation issues to reach the crowded and 
heavyweight agenda of the foreign affairs council, decisions taken on the issues that 
do make the agenda should have more clout than before. 
Two member states, the UK and the Netherlands, have been particularly active in 
promoting policy coherence. The Labour government elected in the UK in 1997 
strengthened the Department for International Development (DFID) and increased its 
budget.  The 1997 White Paper on International Development represents the 
government’s commitment to the internationally agreed target to reduce by half the 
proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 2015.  The 2000 White Paper on 
International Development focused on how to manage the process of globalization to 
benefit poor people.  The second (2000) white paper sets out the UK’s objectives on 
trade and development: to make the Doha Round of multilateral trade talks a real 
“Development Round”, one that brings genuine development benefits to developing 
countries.  To achieve these goals, the UK will continue to press for a pro-
development EU negotiating position.  In addition, DFID has been working with 
developing countries and other development agencies to help build the capacity of 
developing countries to help them more effectively protect and promote their 
interests in the Doha Round.  The 2000 paper presented the UK government’s policy 
that it would push for significant CAP reform leading to reduction, as soon as possible, 
of domestic and export subsidies on EU agricultural products, as well as tariff and non-
tariff barriers to imports from developing countries (DFID 2003). 
The Netherlands government has set up a Policy Coherence Unit in its Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.  This may be the only such policy coherence unit in an EU member 
state, or perhaps in any state.  In late 2002 the cabinet approved and sent to 
parliament a memorandum aimed at improving coherence between the policies of 
agriculture, trade and development.  The Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management 
and Fisheries and the Ministry of Development Cooperation prepared the document.  
The memorandum was presented to parliament by these two ministries in conjunction 
with the Minister for Foreign Trade and the State Secretary for European Affairs.  The 
document describes the Netherlands’ ongoing activities aimed at strengthening policy 
coherence in regard to CAP reform, the WTO negotiations on agriculture, and 
development cooperation policy intended to give developing countries greater 
opportunity for trade and development in the agricultural sector.  The document 
clearly states that, to enhance policy coherence, the Netherlands explicitly promotes 
the interests of developing countries within EU decision-making processes 
(Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003).  The Netherlands government supports 2. Criticism of the CAP 
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relevant research and the activities of international agencies to build capacity in 
trade related fields in developing countries. 
Interviews in April-May 2003 (with officials at DFID and the Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs – DEFRA -- in London and with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs’ Policy Coherence Unit and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature 
Management and Fisheries in The Hague) confirmed the serious commitment of both 
governments to policy coherence.  The interviews also revealed that the officials were 
concerned that their own government’s efforts were strongly affected by the interplay 
of political forces within the EU.  The officials stressed that major reform of the CAP 
was essential if their policy coherence objectives were to be significantly advanced 
during the Doha “development round.” 
Others interviewed, including those who agreed with and supported the efforts to 
promote policy coherence, were concerned that development cooperation 
departments or ministries had little clout within member-state governments, and that 
there was a parallel situation in Brussels where the Directorate-General (DG) 
Development was said to lack influence vis-à-vis DG Agriculture and DG Trade.  One 
conclusion is that development cooperation lacks a strong domestic constituency 
within Europe (although the constituency is far stronger in Europe than in the United 
States) in comparison with the domestic constituency that supports and benefits from 
agriculture and trade in agricultural products.  
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3. EU POLICY-MAKING AND THE CAP 
Why does the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy continue to receive nearly 
50% of the total EU budget when only 4.2% of the population is employed in 
agriculture and the share of agriculture in GDP is only 1.7%?  Why do EU consumers 
and taxpayers continue to pay the high direct and indirect costs the CAP? Powerful 
actors and forces that enabled the CAP to achieve and maintain its position are 
resisting change. Most of the support has come from farmers and agricultural interests 
as well as the French government. At the same time, the research found that several 
factors are influencing change in the direction of reforming the CAP.  These factors 
will be discussed in subsequent chapters. This chapter examines EU domestic policy-
making relevant to the CAP.  It discusses the analytic approach taken, the CAP’s 
background, previous and current efforts to reform the CAP, internal politics of 
member states, and relevant EU institutions. 
Analytic Approach to Understanding EU Policy-Making 
Relevant EU policy-making, especially the recent efforts to achieve CAP reform, 
demonstrates clearly that both domestic and international political and related 
factors are important to understanding EU policy outcomes.  Three levels of policy-
making and hence of analysis were identified for this study, as presented in Figure 1.
11  
(Theoretical issues are briefly discussed in Annex 1.)  The first level involves politics 
internal to member states.  As the figure shows, the primary concern here is with the 
activities of member state governments.  Interest groups, listed along the bottom of 
the diagram, play important roles and are active at all three levels.  The second, or 
“EU level,” involves at least two aspects of EU politics: interstate bargaining and the 
EU institutions that mediate such bargaining and play their own active role.  The two 
most important EU bodies shown in the diagram are the Council of Agricultural 
Ministers and the European Commission, especially its DG for Agriculture.  Finally, the 
third level involves the actors and forces in the international environment that 
influence and are influenced by the EU, especially EU trading partners and the WTO. 
It is important to note that the lines between these different levels are fuzzy.  For 
example, groups within individual member states often draw on the international 
context in efforts to influence their own government’s positions on EU policies.  This 
is what occurs whenever Oxfam UK staff or DFID argue against EU policies they allege 
harm developing countries.  At the same time, interest groups—broadly defined here 
to include farmers, business interests (producers and retailers) and advocacy groups—
within the EU and within individual member states operate in an increasingly trans-
European (and international) environment.  Oxfam, for example, is an international 
NGO and during recent CAP reform efforts aligned itself with other trans-European 
groups, such as the European Consumer’s Organisation (BEUC).  Also, it is significant 
that the timing of policy-making does not necessarily follow a neat, logical movement 
between these different levels.  While individual policy events might follow a 
sequence of sorts -- some describe pricing policy in the CAP as a two-stage sequence 
of national preference formation followed by EU-level inter-state negotiations (De 
Gorter et al. 2000) -- broad-level policy change is a much more complicated, back-
and-forth affair.
12  Finally, it is important to recognize the important role individual 
leaders can play in working between the two levels. The analysis in this chapter will 
                                                 
11 Here we borrow from Patterson (1997), who in turn is strongly influenced by Andrew Moravcik’s work on liberal 
intergovernmentalism and Robert Putnam (1988).  Theoretical issues are (briefly) discussed further in Annex 1. 
12 The end result includes processes with much greater inter-penetration than traditional international relations theory about 
bargaining power would allow but greater influence for the formal levels of government organization themselves than 
found in, for example, US state and federal politics. 3. EU Policy-making and the CAP 
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illustrate, for instance, that Chirac and Schroeder have utilized this two-level 
“games” (in the game theory sense of the word) approach to strengthen their 
domestic positions. 
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History of the CAP  
Box 5:  1957 Treaty of Rome Establishing the EEC, Article 33(1). 
The objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy shall be: 
(a) to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress and by 
ensuring the rational development of agricultural production and the optimum 
utilization of the factors of production, in particular labour; 
(b) thus to ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, in particular 
by increasing the individual earnings of persons engaged in agriculture; 
(c)  to stabilize markets; 
(d)  to assure the availability of supplies; 
(e)  to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
The official objectives of the CAP are all related to domestic European concerns (see 
Box 5).  The issues involved in today’s widely publicized criticisms surrounding the 
global effects of CAP policies, discussed in the previous chapter, were never 
considered when the CAP was established over 40 years ago.  Instead, several internal 
factors contributed to the creation of the CAP.  One, European agriculture then was 
not in the healthy condition it is in today. The conventional story told about the 
creation of the CAP refers to post-WWII food shortages and the need for European 
agriculture to recuperate from the war.  There were then very real concerns about 
European food self-sufficiency, and it is now clear that the CAP has played a key role 
in building a strong European agricultural sector.  Two, it can be argued that in its 
early years the European Economic Community (EEC) needed the CAP.  Rieger (2000) 
contends, “Only with regard to agriculture did the scale of political governance reach 
proportions resembling those of a federal government.”  Agriculture dominated early 
discussions within the EEC, and the prevailing dominant position of the CAP in the EU 
budget supports this view.  The third internal factor was the need to “integrate the 
national farming population into both the transnational and the national polity.”   
Reiger, and others, present this as part of a welfare state explanation even more 
important than the conventional story noted above. 
Table 4 lists some relevant events in CAP history.  Financing of the CAP did not begin 
until 1962 with the establishment of the EAGGF.  In the 1980s several factors changed 
external and internal to the EU that brought pressure to bear on the CAP.  Internally, 
the CAP was a victim of its own success.  Production shortages in the aftermath of 
WWII were transformed by the 1980s into huge surpluses.  Storing and exporting these 
agricultural surpluses became an increasingly expensive burden.  Maintaining the CAP 
itself became more expensive, even as declines were evident in agriculture’s share in 
European GDP and as the sector employed smaller and smaller percentages of 
Europeans (see Annexes 5 and 8)
13.  Early price support policy had relied on taxing 
imports, subsidizing exports, and purchasing farmers’ products when market prices 
fell below a given level (intervention buying).  In the early 1980s the first significant 
supply control mechanisms were established — marketing quotas, co-responsibility 
levies and budgetary stabilizers (Colman 2001). 
                                                 
13 Information presented in Annex 5 is important in regard to the long term trends affecting and driving CAP reform and is 
discussed below in the present chapter and in other chapters. 3. EU Policy-making and the CAP 
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Table 4:  Relevant Events in CAP History. 
Early Years 
1955  Agricultural Law  
1957  Treaty of Rome 
1962 EAGGF  created 
1970  Change in Member State financing of CAP 
1984  Implementation of Milk Quotas 
1986  Uruguay Round commences 
Current Phase of Reform 
1988  Reform focused on budgetary stabilization 
1992  MacSharry Reform (and new budgetary agreement) 
1993  Enlargement Agreement by the Copenhagen European Council 
1994  Uruguay Round concludes 
1995-2000 Implementation  of Uruguay Round Agreements 
1996  UK announces BSE a threat to humans 
1999 (March)  Agenda 2000 agreement at Berlin European Council 
2002 (July)   Fischler’s Mid-Term Review Proposals 
2002 (October)  Chirac-Schroeder Compromise ‘capping the CAP’ 
2002  Decisions on EU budget for agriculture until 2013 
2002  Agricultural Policy Decisions for the enlarged EU 
Most Recent Events 
2003 (January)  Legislative Proposals for MTR 
2003 (June)  Luxembourg Agreement on CAP Reform  
2003 (September)  Cancun WTO Meeting 
 
Externally, Europe’s trading partners were very concerned about the impact of the 
CAP on world markets.  The United States faced a relative decline in its agriculture 
export volume throughout the 1980s, a major reason for its insistence on making 
agriculture central to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT’s) Uruguay 
Round (Colman 2001, Swinback and Tanner 1996).  Trade conflicts escalated as the 
existence of EU surpluses resulted in depressed agricultural commodity prices at the 
global level.  These external pressures played an important role in bringing about the 
CAP reforms of 1988 and 1992. 3. EU Policy-making and the CAP 
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The 1988 and the 1992 (MacSharry) Reforms 
The 1988 and 1992 (MacSharry) reforms signaled the end of an early phase of the CAP 
and the beginning of the current reform-oriented phase.  The 1988 reform focused on 
stabilizing a rapidly increasing budget.  The measures taken, however, had little to do 
with real reform of the structure of farming support. The MacSharry reforms, on the 
other hand, were different.  While many of the old mechanisms for maintaining the 
internal market remained in place, several changes did occur.  Most importantly, price 
supports were replaced with direct payments linked to production (measured by 
historic yields). This was an attempt to discourage over-production, as (generally 
speaking) increases in future production could not expect to be met by similar 
increases in subsidies. 
Significantly, a mechanism termed “modulation”  was introduced, under which EU 
farm spending was transferred from market-related support payments to rural 
development measures.  This mechanism emphasized what is now regularly referred 
to in today’s discussions and debates about the CAP as the “multifunctionality” of 
agriculture.  That is, the position that agriculture is much more than simply the 
production of food and fiber but is also directly involved in protecting the 
environment, including rural landscapes, and promoting sustainable development, 
including the economic viability of (and poverty alleviation in) rural areas.  In the 
MacSharry reform, multifunctionality came in the form of incentives to comply with 
new agri-environmental regulations.  Today, pillar II support is linked to compliance 
with certain criteria concerning the environment, rural development, food safety and 
food quality, and animal welfare. 
The main target of the MacSharry reforms was the arable crops sector, and the overall 
level of price support for this sector was reduced.  Due to modulation there was little 
change for small producers and some received compensatory payments conditioned on 
compliance with set-aside requirements.  Minor changes were made with regard to 
milk quotas but no real reform was made here.  Regarding beef, intervention prices 
were reduced, but premiums to producers were increased.  The variance in treatment 
of different sectors was linked to the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations occurring 
at the time. 
Agenda 2000 and the June 2003 “Luxembourg Agreement” 
Both the earlier 1988 and the more recent Agenda 2000 reforms followed the 
beginnings of new rounds of multilateral trade negotiations; each round focused more 
than any previous international negotiations on liberalizing trade in agriculture. In the 
case of the Agenda 2000 reforms, there was only minor tweaking of the dairy and beef 
support regimes. An important innovation under Agenda 2000 was the extension of the 
second pillar, begun with the agri-environmental measures of the MacSharry reforms, 
to include early retirement schemes, afforestation, and payments to assist farmers in 
Least Favored Areas.  
In sharp contrast, both the MacSharry and the June 2003 reforms have been associated 
w i t h  a  c h a n g e  i n  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  C A P .   I n  1 9 9 2 ,  t h e  u s e  o f  d i r e c t  p a y m e n t s  w a s  
considered revolutionary, increasing the transparency of the entire system.  The 2003 
reforms are similarly considered important for their moves toward “decoupling” 
support measures from production. 
The EU described the June 2003 agreement in Luxembourg as a fundamental reform of 
the CAP, stating that the decisions meant a “complete change” in the way the EU 
would support its farm sector.  Subsidies would be de-linked (or “decoupled” in the 
language of Brussels) from production.  The intention was to break the link between 
supports to producers for specific agricultural commodities and the amount of the 
commodities the farmers actually produce.  The stated goal of decoupling is to make 
EU farmers more competitive and market-oriented, while providing income stability.  3. EU Policy-making and the CAP 
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To replace the previous support mechanisms, there will be new “single farm 
payments” linked to environmental, food safety and animal welfare standards.  The 
reformed CAP, according to the EU, is “geared towards consumers and taxpayers, 
while giving EU farmers the freedom to produce what the market wants” (EU 2003a).
14  
Although there was widespread recognition that the June 2003 agreement was the 
most significant reform in the history of the CAP (see DG Agriculture 2003c), it was 
also clear that the agreement represented a very diluted version of the proposals 
presented by the EC agriculture commissioner Franz Fischler in July 2002.  The CAP 
budget was not reduced and, at € 43 billion a year, still represents nearly half of the 
total EU budget.  The links between production and support were only partly severed.  
Beef producers did particularly well, as there would be only 70% decoupling for them.  
Some countries were to begin decoupling in 2005 while other countries could wait 
until 2007. The reforms did not directly address the key issues of market access and 
export subsidies. 
Internal Member State Politics 
There are several reasons that internal member state politics are important in 
understanding CAP policy-making and reform efforts (see the far left of Figure 1).  The 
most important reason is that member state ministers who make key decisions at the 
EU level are primarily accountable to their own member state.  Their decisions largely 
reflect the positions of their own ministry and the positions and advice of other 
ministries and parliament in their home country.  These factors are particularly 
important in regard to decisions made by the Council of Agriculture Ministers.  EU 
member state ministers and other political leaders may be able to get political 
outcomes from the EU they are unable to obtain domestically, and citing EU 
constraints can be an effective political weapon.  On the other hand, the politics of 
individual member states may also constrain other member states.  
Another reason is that member states also provide support for agriculture beyond that 
provided by the CAP.  The WTO (2002a) estimates that € 14.5 billion was provided in 
2000,
15 almost a third of the total amount spent by the EAGGF.  A very recent reason 
that internal member state politics is important is that the 2003 CAP reform grants 
individual member states higher levels of flexibility in the implementation of the 
reformed CAP.  A key issue is the timing of decoupling.  The June Luxembourg 
agreement allows member states to choose when to decouple, with the choice ranging 
from almost immediately to 2007.  (It is expected that France will wait until the last 
minute to implement the decoupling reforms whereas the UK is making plans to begin 
as soon as possible.)  Member states are also given some flexibility over the amount of 
decoupling allowed, especially in the beef sector.  The ramifications of this flexibility 
for internal and external markets are still not well understood. 
June 2003 CAP Reform – Diverging Positions of Member States 
The 15 EU member states reacted very differently to the DG Agriculture’s July 2002 
proposals to significantly reform the CAP, and there was intense debate within Europe 
                                                 
14 Some accused the Commission of presiding over a “renationalization” of the CAP. June reforms grant member states 
greater flexibility in implementation than previous years, allowing up to 10% of each state’s aid entitlements to be used 
for “encouraging specific types of farming.” States also have flexibility in deciding the form and timing of decoupling.  
Commissioner Fischler was quick to deny such claims (Agra Europe, 27 June 2003). 
15 The WTO Trade Policy Review continues: “Although national expenditures have remained at about the same level since 
1995, this is mainly the result of a steep decline in national expenditure by Germany since then (down 40%), as national 
expenditures rose rapidly in Ireland (up 322%), Portugal (122%), the Netherlands (74%), Sweden (67%), Belgium (64%), and 
the United Kingdom (60%). The trend to increasing national expenditure is likely to have continued in 2001 as a result of 
emergency funds granted to agricultural producers affected by Foot and Mouth Disease, BSE and the crisis in confidence in 
meat.” 3. EU Policy-making and the CAP 
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on these issues.  The positions of the different countries followed established 
patterns.  The UK, the Netherlands and Sweden were squarely in the pro-reform 
camp.  The opponents of reform were led by France and included Ireland, Spain and 
Portugal.  The position of Germany was unclear.  The various countries maintained 
their general positions in the run-up to the June 2003 Agreement. 
Countries with important agricultural sectors relative to current EU-15 standards (such 
as France) and/or large rural populations, and thus larger proportions of their 
electorate interested in agricultural issues (such as Spain and Portugal) tend to oppose 
reform.
16  Countries that produce large quantities of commodities favored by the CAP 
(such as France and Ireland in regard to LLPs) resist reform.  Ireland, for example, 
r e ce i ve s  6 7 %  o f i t s  CA P  p a y m e nt s  in s up p o r t  o f “ a ni m a l p r o d uct s . ”   The  s t r o ng e s t 
supporter of CAP reform is the UK, which has the lowest proportion of its population 
employed in agriculture (1.4%) of any EU-15 country.  The equivalent proportion in 
France is 4.1%, just below the EU-15 average of 4.2%.  In France the share of 
agriculture in GDP is 2.2%; in the UK the share is only 0.6% (the EU-15 average is 
1.7%).  In 2001 France received 22.2% of the total CAP funds from the EU, the UK 
received 9.6% of the total CAP funds (see Annex 5). 
Figure 2 depicts the EU-15 in regard to net CAP payments in 2001.  The pattern in 
which the different member states are presented corresponds quite closely to their 
position on CAP reform. 
Figure 2:  Net CAP Payments in 2001. 
 
Although the issue of which EU member states are net payers into and which are net 
beneficiaries of the CAP has received a great deal of attention and publicity, the 
situation is not so straightforward. The European Commission’s produced its own 
figures regarding the “operational budgetary balance” of the EU-15 in regard to each 
country’s contribution from 1995-2001 to the EU budget as a whole (see Annex 7). 
France was a net contributor to the EU budget during the 1995-2001 period, a point 
stressed by a few of those interviewed during the course of this study.  Ten of the 15 
member states were net contributors.  Germany, of course, was by far the largest net 
contributor to the EU budget.  Ranked in order, the top five net contributors were: 
Germany, the United Kingdom (after the UK correction), the Netherlands, Sweden and 
France.  The five net beneficiaries were, ranked in order: Spain, Greece, Portugal, 
Ireland and Denmark. 
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Box 6:  Germany’s Ambiguous Position Regarding CAP Reform and the Schroeder-Chirac 
“Deals”. 
Germany’s recent position regarding CAP reform has been ambiguous.  Developments 
within Germany since the national elections in 1998 would suggest that Germany would 
be strongly in the pro-reform camp (Schrader 2003).  Some of those interviewed shared 
this view, and there are several reasons why this might be the case.  As the largest 
contributor to the CAP, Germany has a major incentive to reform the system in order 
to reduce its own contribution.  Since the 1990s there have been changes in Germany’s 
internal politics that have reduced the influence of the agriculture sector, thus making 
it easier for the German government to push for reform of the CAP at the EU level.  
The current Social Democratic government has appointed a member of the Green Party 
as Minister of ‘Agriculture’.  Others interviewed and some key developments, however, 
suggest that it is difficult to know where Germany stands on CAP reform.  It may be 
that CAP reform has become a bargaining chip for Germany in inter-state negotiations. 
The main reason that serious questions were raised about Germany’s commitment to 
CAP reform stem from two recent “deals” between Gerhard Schroeder and Jacques 
Chirac that have (or appear to have) had enormous impact on issues related to the 
CAP. The first agreement between the German and French leaders took place in 
October 2002 when they made an agreement to limit CAP spending for the 2007-2013 
period.  (The amount of funding until 2006 had already been set.)  This deal between 
these two leaders was and remains very important in regard to the future financing of 
the EU enlargement (discussed in chapter 4), and the ceiling on CAP spending will 
mean a reduction in real terms.  Some supporters of CAP reform, however, felt that 
this agreement between Chirac and Schroeder severely undercut efforts to achieve 
serious reform of the EU’s agricultural policies.  As the leader of the country with the 
strongest pro-reform position, Blair was isolated by what is considered an informal but 
very influential deal between the French and German leaders. 
The second agreement reached by Schroeder and Chirac took place in June 2003, just 
before the agriculture ministers of the EU-15 began their meetings to decide the fate 
of the proposals for significant CAP reform tabled by the Commission’s DG Agriculture.  
According to several European newspapers (for example, Financial Times, 16 June 
2003), Schroeder is reported to have agreed to support France’s efforts to water down 
the proposed CAP reform while, in turn, Chirac agreed to support Germany’s efforts to 
oppose the EC’s plans on mergers and acquisitions.  In the end, France achieved its 
goal of maintaining elements of the CAP in the face of very strong pro-reform 
pressure.  Germany argued that it had been able to get France to break the tense 
deadlock and at least agree to some reform of the CAP.  The reported trade off 
between French agriculture interests and German business interests suggest that 
domestic member state political issues, including those seemingly far removed from 
farming, can be very relevant to EU decision-making in regard to reforming the CAP.  
The deals between Chirac and Schroeder may reflect several factors: the long-lasting 
relationship between the two countries on EU issues and a longstanding trade-off on 
agricultural support.  France and Germany have and continue to share similar views on 
other EU issues and, according to Keeler (1996), they have cooperated in the past to 
significantly water down efforts to reform the CAP.  After the October 2002 deal, 
Chirac was quoted as saying: “If there is no Franco-German accord, Europe grinds to a 
halt” (The Economist, 2 November 2002).  It may be significant that, as noted above, 
the strongest proponent of CAP reform, the UK, was on the sidelines during the deals.  
Clearly, internal member state politics and relationships between different EU 
countries play an important role in EU policy-making on agriculture. 
The role of member state domestic politics is significant in regard to the agreement 
between the German and French leaders (the situation in France is discussed in the 
box that follows).  A coalition of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) 
and the Green Party formed Germany’s federal government after the 1998 general 
election, and established new priorities in regard to agricultural policy.  The SPD 
identified as a concern the unacceptable distributional consequences of the CAP 
among EU member states.  The Green Party focused on environmental issues, including 3. EU Policy-making and the CAP 
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a shift towards sustainable farming and improving animal welfare.  The SPD was very 
concerned about Germany’s high share of the EU budget, and it became clear that the 
government intended to reassess the CAP in general and, in so doing, risk a 
confrontation with the farmers’ union that had enjoyed a cozy relationship with 
previous governments.  The German government was very concerned about its growing 
national budget problem, and the enlargement of the EU risked big increases in both 
EU and national budgets, especially for agriculture (Schrader 2003). 
After the European Commission presented its proposals for CAP reform in July 2002, 
the German chancellor insisted that there be a delay in the final decision on the CAP 
until 2003.  He further insisted that: (a) the financial framework agreed at the Berlin 
Summit in 1999 should remain in place after enlargement; and (b) direct payments to 
farmers in the accession countries - not included in the framework - be financed out of 
a reduction of direct payments in the EU-15.  This remained the position of the 
German government after the coalition of the SPD and the Greens won the national 
election in 2002.  On the other hand, the French and several southern European 
countries opposed any cut in direct payments (Schrader 2003).  The election also in 
2002 of a conservative French government headed by Jacques Chirac stiffened French 
resistance to CAP reform.  In spite of differences, the German and French leaders 
reached the agreement noted above to limit future CAP spending. 
Box 7:  France’s Role in Protecting the CAP. 
France is well known as the strongest supporter and defender of the CAP among the EU 
member states.  The reasons include the relatively important role agriculture plays in 
the French economy and the extraordinary influence of farmers, especially cattle 
farmers, and their organizations in domestic politics.  These factors have considerable 
influence on France’s positions on CAP reform.  During the June 2003 negotiations of 
the Council of Agriculture Ministers on the EC proposals for CAP reform, France 
threatened to use its right of veto in an effort to block further reform.
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One reason for France’s solid support of the CAP relates to its key role when the CAP 
was originally established at a time when there were only six member states in the 
EEC.  A widespread current view is that France defends the CAP because it is the 
biggest beneficiary, over € 9 billion or 22.2% of the total in 2001.  But these figures 
need to be put in context.  The percentage of EU-15 CAP benefits that France receives 
is nearly the same as its percentage of EU-15 agricultural output (22.6%) and utilized 
agricultural area (21.7%).  Simply put, France is the EU’s biggest agricultural producer 
(Glaz and Messerlin 2003)
18, and what it receives from the CAP reflects this fact.  The 
critics reply that France is a leading net beneficiary of the CAP, receiving more in 
benefits than it pays.  While this is correct, as pointed out above, France was a net 
contributor to the EU budget during the 1995-2001 period.  France also has the highest 
national expenditure on agriculture in the EU. 
Farmers’ organizations and their leaders have exceptional political influence in France.  
The most powerful farmers trade union, the Federation Nationale des Syndicats des 
Exploitants Agricoles (FNSEA), served as the sole counterpart on agricultural issues of 
all French governments from 1945 until the late 1990s.  This relationship included day-
to-day management of farm policies.  One FNSEA president became the Minister of 
Agriculture and served in Jacques Chirac’s government in 1986-1988.  A president of 
the FNSEA branch for young farmers became an adviser to President Chirac in the late 
1990s.  In 1997 the FNSEA monopoly was slightly weakened when the government 
began discussions with another trade union, the Farmers Confederation (CP), which 
                                                 
17 As noted in chapter 3, EU member states have the option to veto a measure. According to the Luxembourg compromise, an 
MS can veto a proposal when it considers the proposal a threat to its vital national interests 
18 France leads the EU in the production of cereals (is fifth in the world), and is second in milk production after Germany 
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was opposed to basic CAP instruments and methods.  The CP now represents 25% of 
French farmers (Glaz and Messerlin 2003). 
There is also an extraordinary link between French presidents and the Federation 
Nationale Bovine (FNB), an independent trade union restricted to cattle farmers, that 
may help explain why beef is such a protected commodity under the CAP.  Unofficially 
the FNB is close to the FNSEA.  The majority of FNB members are specialist beef 
producers from Central France who produce beef by extensive (grass-based) methods 
on small farms, often in difficult hilly or mountainous regions.  Their income is among 
the lowest of French farmers, and direct CAP subsidies represented over 100% of their 
income in 2001.  During the last 30 years, all French presidents have had very close 
relations with FNB farmers.  The presidents either originally came from Central 
France, or had been acquainted with the FNB farmers for a long time (Glaz and 
Messerlin 2003, Stoeckel 2003). 
France is the largest EU producer of beef, with one-quarter of total beef production.  
The “professional farms” specializing in beef in Central France, the FNB members, 
produce 37% of total French beef.  The FNB understands the political advantages it can 
draw on because its members play a major role in occupying, shaping and managing 
(amenagement du territoire) Central France.  The FNB uses its role in “managing 
territory” in its lobbying efforts to justify keeping tariffs high.  Its position is reported 
to be that high tariffs are needed to restrict imports that, in the trade union’s view, 
could damage the environment as well as the economy and survival of certain regions.  
The FNB is said to reject any export capacity for European cattle production, although 
their reasons were not presented or explained (Glaz and Messerlin 2003, Stoeckel 
2003). 
The importance of the “farm vote would make it impossible for French politicians to 
ignore agricultural interests in the context of any electoral system, but one can infer 
that the farm lobby derives even more leverage from the system now employed for 
both the presidency and the national assembly” (Keeler 1996).  For example, in the 
two-ballot direct election system for president, very narrow margins often determine 
the fate of first ballot candidates.  At least two-thirds of farmers generally support the 
parties or presidential candidates of the moderate right that held national power for 
most of the post-war period.  The ties are particularly close with the Rassemblement 
pour la République and its leader, Jacques Chirac.  Another feature of the French 
system enhances the political power of French farmers.  France has more local 
administrative districts, many of them sparsely populated rural communes, than any 
other EU state.  In 1989, 28.5% of French mayors were active farmers (Keeler 1996). 
At the March 1999 European Council in Berlin, Chirac was able to significantly water 
down the Agenda 2000 CAP reform.  The agreement with Gerhard Schroeder on the eve 
of the Council of Agriculture Ministers’ June 2003 negotiations regarding the 
Commission’s CAP reform proposals was considered by some interviewed as another 
example.  It was during this series of very difficult negotiations on CAP reform in June 
2003 that France threatened a veto. 
After a diluted CAP reform was agreed at the end of June, Le Monde wrote in an 
editorial that France’s flexibility in accepting CAP reform should be congratulated.   
The newspaper pointedly noted that France’s position on EU agricultural policy had 
become unsustainable, and that for 30 years Jacques Chirac had constantly battled to 
maintain the CAP.  His refusal to change, however, flew in the face of the changes in 
European agriculture and had placed France at the center of controversy with her 
current EU partners, her future partners (the accessions countries), the Americans, 
and poor countries in the WTO.  Agricultural issues were thus threatening France’s 
diplomacy vis-à-vis the EU and the rest of the world (Le Monde 27 June 2003). 3. EU Policy-making and the CAP 
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European Union Institutions 
It is at the EU level of our analytic framework that interstate bargaining takes place in 
regard to EU agricultural policy-making. The role of EU institutions is extremely 
important in regard to EU agricultural policy-making, as these institutions not only 
mediate between the member states but also promote their own policy preferences.  
Key EU institutions and some of their relationships are presented in the middle column 
of Figure 1.   
In principle, the Council of Agriculture Ministers of the 15 EU member states 
(Agriculture Council) makes final decisions regarding EU agricultural policy.
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Sometimes these decisions are influenced or modified by decisions made by heads of 
state at the European Council or other meetings.  The European Parliament’s formal 
role has been limited to advice in regard to most CAP-related issues, except for 
specific rural development activities.  The special committee on agriculture, 
management committees for each commodity group (civil servants from national 
agriculture ministries and from member states permanent representations in Brussels), 
and their own staff support the ministers. 
Only the European Commission has the right to make proposals that are considered 
and decided by the Council of Ministers.
20  This means the Commission enjoys the 
critical role of shaping the agenda.  The Commission is also responsible for 
implementing and enforcing EU policies, providing it with additional authority and 
influence.  For the recent CAP reform, in July 2002 the Commissioner of Agriculture, 
Franz Fischler, provided the official communication (the Mid-Term Review proposals) 
that launched the reform process.  In January 2003 the Commission provided the 
relevant legislative proposals.  
DG Agriculture has the most interaction with the Agriculture Council.  It is significant, 
however, that the full Commission endorses the formal proposals to the Council.  As a 
result, there is an opportunity for input by and Council interaction with, inter alia, DG 
Trade, DG Health, DG Development and DG Environment.  Thurston (2002) has argued 
that this institutional arrangement provides the Commission an advantage in terms of 
agenda setting for complex, inter-linked policy issues such as those involved in the 
CAP and its reform.  For example, DG Trade can help structure a particular position 
used in multilateral trade negotiations, and this in turn frames the range of decisions 
that can be taken in regard to CAP reform.  It is very relevant to the present study 
that the Commission’s sponsorship of European integration provides it with a set of 
policy preferences of its own, not necessarily those of individual member states.   
These preferences include European integration, maintenance of the single European 
market, and the promotion of a distinctly European structural policy (Thurston 2002).  
During the recent struggle over CAP reform, DG Agriculture both set the agenda and 
p u s h e d  m e m b e r  s t a t e s  t o w a r d  a n  o v e r a l l  d i r e c t i o n  o f  p o l i c y  r e f o r m  t h a t  s e v e r a l  
member states did not initially support. 
Some Council of Ministers’ decisions require unanimity, but most require qualified 
majority voting, as is currently the case for CAP reform (see Annex 2, “EU Voting, 
Population and Representation”).  In practice, however, consensus is the goal.  Under 
the present treaty, EU member states also have the option to veto any measure they 
consider a threat to their “vital interests.” 
The country holding the rotating EU presidency may sometimes be a significant factor 
in EU agricultural policy-making.  This factor appears to have had an influence on the 
outcome of the recent effort to reform the CAP.  For example, the Greek government 
                                                 
19 In principle there is one Council of Ministers.  In reality there are several different Councils dealing with separate policy 
a r e a s .   E a c h  C o u n c i l  a c t s  w i t h  e q u a l  a u t h o r i t y .   O f  t h e various Councils, the Council of Agriculture Ministers has 
responsibility for CAP reform. 
20 A Council of Ministers cannot formally consider any proposal that has not come from the Commission (Article 43 of the 
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held the EU presidency during the first half of 2003.  Those involved in the tense 
agriculture negotiations were well aware of the importance of the end of June 
deadline.  The Greek government had been playing a key role in the negotiations, 
including tabling compromise proposals in efforts to reach agreement in the final 
weeks.  If a decision were not reached by 30 June, the negotiating equation would be 
significantly changed as the Italian government would take over the EU presidency.  
The agreement to reform the CAP was finally reached on 26 June, after an all-night 
session following weeks of negotiations by the European Commission’s DG Agriculture 
and EU member state agriculture ministers and their support staffs. 
When the Agriculture Council is unable to resolve certain issues, the outstanding 
matters can be referred to the European Council made up of the heads of state of the 
15 EU member countries.  This course of action took place at the March 1999 Berlin 
European Council in regard to the Agenda 2000 CAP reform. 
Box 8:  The Sapir Group Report. 
A report by an independent High Level Group presented in July 2003 proposed 
fundamental changes in how the EU budget should be divided between different 
sectors.  The group, chaired by Andre Sapir of the University of Brussels, had been 
requested by the EC president Romano Prodi to prepare the report.  The recommended 
reforms included drastically reducing spending on the CAP to 10% of the current level, 
and the re-nationalization to EU member states of many CAP functions.  The group 
looked at the agriculture sector in the context of overall EU priorities.  From this 
perspective, the authors concluded that major cuts in the agriculture budget were 
necessary to revive economic growth and promote employment in an enlarged EU.  The 
resulting savings, in the group’s view, could be better spent in research and 
development, education, cross-border infrastructure, economic cohesion between 
regions, and economic restructuring.  The reduction in spending on the CAP was 
justified by four reasons, the most important being that the CAP simply did not deliver 
in terms of promoting the economic well being of the EU.  The speed and widespread 
nature of the highly critical reaction to the proposals by senior EU officials and others 
indicates the importance and sensitivity of the issues surrounding CAP reform. (See 
Annex 3 for additional information on the Sapir Group report.)  
EU Enlargement and Implications for the CAP  
The addition of ten new member states represents an enormous challenge for the EU.  
Most of the accession countries that will join the EU in May 2004 are from eastern and 
central Europe
21.  It is anticipated that Bulgaria and Romania will accede in 2007, and 
that Turkey will join later.  While there has been a good deal of speculation about the 
impact of enlargement on the CAP and on livestock production in the newly expanded 
EU, most analysts predict very little change in overall production, consumption and 
trade trends.  Additionally, steps have been taken to contain future CAP expenditure, 
as evident in the Chirac-Schroeder deal to “cap the CAP” and more general concerns 
about the EU budget.  
Complications Posed by the CAP to the Accession Process 
To facilitate the accession process, the EU has formed a number of agreements with 
the candidate countries, but these only partially cover trade in agricultural and food 
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products.  Recent bilateral agreements on further trade concessions are seen as 
important instruments to gradually liberalize bilateral trade in preparation for the full 
integration of the candidate countries into the EU’s agricultural markets. The 
Commission adopted an enlargement strategy paper in November 2000 that includes 
negotiations for additional reciprocal trade concessions in regard to agricultural 
products (DG Agriculture 2002b). 
A key question of the accession negotiations concerns how the agricultural sectors of 
the accession countries will be integrated into the CAP.  In January 2002 the 
Commission presented an “Issues Paper” covering direct payments, quotas and other 
supply management instruments such as maximum guaranteed areas and maximum 
guaranteed quantities, rural development policies, and other proposals for discussion 
with the Council.  The EU considers that progress has been made in all the candidate 
countries, but that the restructuring of the agriculture and food industries is far from 
complete.  In regard to the difficult issue of direct payments to farmers, the 
Commission proposed starting direct payments at a low level combined with 
intensified support for restructuring, particularly in regard to rural development 
activities.  In regard to production supply management, the Commission proposed to 
base production quotas on recent reference periods.  For milk, for example, the 
reference period would be 1997-1999; more recent figures would be taken into 
consideration where they exist.  Building on work done under the Special Accession 
Program for Agriculture and Rural Development (established for the candidate 
countries in the period leading up to accession), an enhanced rural development 
strategy was introduced to deal with the structural problems in the rural areas of the 
candidate countries.
22  A wide range of additional rural development measures will be 
financed by the EAGGF.  In 1999, the Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-
Accession established funds for environmental infrastructure projects, to bring then 
up to EU standards, and improvements in transport infrastructure in an effort to 
enable the expanded single market to function smoothly (DG Agriculture 2002b). 
Major efforts have been made since 2000 to further liberalize agricultural trade.   
Negotiations with candidate countries that began in December 2001 aimed to extend 
the trade liberalization process to the more sensitive sectors, to products for which an 
internal CAP support system is applied, coupled with high border protection.  These 
sensitive sectors include cereals, dairy, beef and sheep meat (DG Agriculture 2002b). 
There has been particular concern about the CAP-related implications of Poland’s 
entry into the EU.  With a population nearing 40 million, Poland alone represents more 
than half the total population of the ten accession countries.  Farmers make up nearly 
20% of Poland’s workforce, a higher percentage than any other accession country and 
five times greater than the EU-15 average.  Poland has very large populations of pigs 
and cattle (Weiler et al. 2003), and it ranks fourth in the world in the production of 
pigmeat, and fifth in the production of milk and butter (Table 1).  Romania, slated for 
entry into the EU in 2007, has a population of over 22 million, and 44% of Romania’s 
work force is employed in agriculture. The question of how the CAP will be applied to 
Poland and Romania remains unanswered. 
Agricultural Production and Trade in an Enlarged EU 
The general view is that the addition of the ten candidate countries will not add to 
the current agricultural surpluses in the EU as a whole.  As farming in the candidate 
countries is much less productive than in the EU-15, this situation might change over 
time if the agriculture sectors in central and eastern Europe become more efficient.  
A decade ago it was believed that agricultural production in Central European 
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areas with environmental restrictions; agri-environmental programmes; afforestation of agricultural land; specific 
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countries would increase dramatically, but this has not happened.  Recent predictions 
by the Commission and other researchers suggest decreased production of dairy and 
beef in the candidate countries in the coming years. Predictions did not consider the 
implications of a single market in an enlarged EU (Massink and Meester 2002). 
 A study by the Dutch Agricultural Economics Research Institute (LEI) did consider the 
implications of a single market.  The LEI study predicted that one of the main 
consequences of such an enlarged market would be even more concentrated trade in 
agricultural products within an enlarged EU, at the expense of traditional trade 
relations with third countries.  Each country in the EU was predicted to make better 
use of its own comparative advantage.  The resulting shifts in production would 
particularly affect highly protected products such as sugar, dairy and beef.  Such 
shifts were expected in all candidate countries.  The LEI study further predicted that 
increased agricultural production in the candidate countries would have only marginal 
effects on production levels in the EU-15.  By implication there would not be extreme 
concentration on primary production in Central Europe and on distribution and 
processing in Western Europe (Massink and Meester 2002).
23 
DG Agriculture’s recent study predicts the impact of enlargement on agricultural 
production, consumption and marketable surpluses for the 2003-2010 period to be 
limited.  Using Agenda 2000 reforms as their baseline, they expect that for beef all 
three aspects of the market will be relatively stable for the new EU-25.  Total milk 
production may actually decrease.  Only cheese is expected to benefit from the new 
market environment (DG Agriculture 2003d).
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A Deal to Cap the CAP 
The “deal” to limit CAP spending for the 2007-2013 period, agreed by Jacques Chirac 
and Gerhard Schroeder at a European summit meeting in October 2002, has significant 
implications.  Agricultural spending will continue at the 2006 limit plus an increase of 
1% annually.  This ceiling on spending will mean a reduction in real terms.
25  The  
agreement between these leaders was very important in regard to future financing of 
the EU enlargement.  Chirac and Schroeder appear to have concluded that it would be 
too expensive for the EU to continue providing CAP benefits similar to those being 
provided within the EU-15 to an enlarged EU with 25 member states.  This decision, 
based on budgetary concerns, may well have a major impact on the future of the CAP 
in the enlarged EU, as it will lead to increased competition for the available 
resources.
 26 
The EU budget is small in relation to national budgets, as expenditure is limited to a 
maximum of 1.27% of GDP compared to total government expenditure in the EU of 
44.4% of GDP in 2001.  The restriction could only be changed by unanimous agreement 
of the member states.  Although relatively small, the EU expenditure has been 
important in the poorer member states and in the poorer regions of the wealthier 
member states, and also for agriculture (Economist Intelligence Unit 2003). 
In recent years some in Europe have held that the addition to the EU of the new 
countries in central and eastern Europe would put enormous strain on the EU budget 
as the accession countries are poor, have weak economies, are beset by 
                                                 
23 The LEI calculations do not apply Agenda 2000 decisions to the candidate countries (no direct income support and no 
production quota for sugar and dairy products). 
24 See also the impact assessments of the January 2003 legislative proposals for CAP reform, which were later watered down 
by the agreement of June 2003, and the OECD (2003c) predictions. 
25 Assuming inflation continues at current rates; in a period of deflation, real expenditures would rise. 
26 Prior to negotiations during the past year, several academic articles suggested that enlargement would have the general 
affect of reducing the support given to current EU farmers through the CAP –  the primary reason for this being that 
politicians of the current EU members would have lower preferences for agricultural protection in the new and expanded 
CAP than in the current CAP (De Gorter et al. 2000) 3. EU Policy-making and the CAP 
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environmental and corruption problems, and will want to benefit as much as possible 
from the CAP.  EU support to the accession countries would inevitably cause strains 
within the EU-15, according to this view, as less money would be available for Greece, 
Spain, Portugal and southern Italy.  Increased EU attention to the accession countries 
would also mean less money would be available for development assistance activities, 
and perhaps less concern with the needs of developing countries in multilateral trade 
negotiations.  Similar concerns were expressed by some of the individuals interviewed 
but not, perhaps significantly, by Commission staff.  Those working for the 
Commission with whom these issues were discussed maintained that no such pressures 
existed as the relevant decisions had been made, at Council meetings for example, 
and the relevant budgets agreed well into the future.   
A Constitution for the EU 
The Convention on the Future of Europe presented a draft constitutional treaty in July 
2003.  There are indications in the draft constitution that the European Parliament 
might obtain the right to become involved in determining agricultural legislation.  If 
this happens, it might significantly change how EU agricultural policy, and therefore 
LLP policy, is made.  Involvement by the European Parliament would introduce a new 
set of actors and forces into CAP policy-making.  In addition, debate and negotiations 
regarding the proposed constitution have revealed existing and potential cleavages 
within an enlarged EU that could affect future CAP policy-making. 
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4. THE ROLES AND STRATEGIES OF INTEREST GROUPS 
This chapter examines additional forces that drive or retard CAP reform, including the 
activities and roles of key interest groups.  A range of interest groups that attempt to 
influence relevant EU policy-making are shown along the bottom of Figure 1 in chapter 
3.  These groups tend to operate at both the member state and EU levels.  Farmers 
and their organizations are certainly important, as are relevant businesses (processors 
and retailers) and their organizations.  The term “advocacy group” is used here to 
refer to organizations that promote the interests of consumers, the environment, 
animal welfare and developing countries. 
Some Important Trends 
Before discussing the roles and activities of specific interest groups, it is first useful to 
identify key trends that are very important to EU agricultural policy-making in general 
and to CAP reform in particular.  One such trend is the tremendous decline in the 
proportion of the European population employed in agriculture since the CAP was 
established over 40 years ago (see Annexes 5 and 8). For example, between 1970 and 
2001 the percentage drops include: France, from 13.5% to 4.1%, Germany from 8.6% to 
2.6%, Italy from 20.2% to 5.2%, and Spain from 29.5% to 6.5%.  Other relevant long-
term trends include the decline in the share of agriculture in member states’ GDP, the 
decline in the total number of agricultural holdings, and the aging of the farming 
population as the children of farmers go into other occupations.  At the same time, 
many Europeans want to maintain the rural landscapes that predate the advent of 
industrialized production of pigs, chickens and other livestock. 
The outbreaks of BSE and other livestock diseases have led to heightened European 
concerns with food safety.  Food retailers have reacted by greatly increasing their 
efforts to provide safe and high-quality food.  Animal rights activists focusing on 
certain industrial agricultural production practices in the raising of livestock have hit a 
sensitive chord in Europe and been able to score major gains.  In response to all of 
these factors, the ministries of agriculture in several EU member states have 
broadened their responsibilities to include the environment, rural development, food 
safety, food quality and animal rights.  What was previously the ministry of agriculture 
in the UK, for example, is now called the Department of Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs (DEFRA). 
Interest Group Strategies 
Beyond the governmental actors, other EU actors — collectively called “interest 
groups” in this paper — influence EU policy-making.  These interest groups are 
represented along the bottom of Figures 1 and 6 and are not necessarily specific to 
national, EU-level or international politics.  
At the EU level, perhaps the most common interest group strategy is lobbying. 
Lobbying at both the member-state level and the EU level are critical for EU 
agricultural and trade policy.  Not only is it important to lobby at both levels, argues 
Kohler-Koch (1997), it would also “be a short-sighted strategy just to concentrate on 
one EU institution.”  
When deciding where interest groups should concentrate their lobbying effort it is 
essential to know when they lobby.  The three relevant phases in a policy’s life are 
the: (1) problem-defining and agenda-setting stage; (2) actual creation of the policy, 4. The Roles and Strategies of Interest Groups 
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which in the case of the CAP involves intergovernmental bargaining; and (3) 
implementation of the policy.
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At the international level, multilateral trade negotiations, such as the current Doha 
Round, present the best opportunity to impact EU policy-making.  Interest groups can 
influence EU trading partners and relevant international organizations (such as the 
WTO, OIE, and Codex) to help set the EU policy-making agenda.  The development of 
international trade rules today largely takes place in the context of the WTO.  But the 
WTO itself is intergovernmental; non-state actors have no legal standing.  And non-
state actors have little access to WTO meetings and negotiations (although certain 
aspects of this have been changing). 
The discussion on EU-level interest group politics is largely relevant to the 
international level, especially in its conceptualization of the three-phase norm/policy 
life-cycle.  One key difference is that the WTO as an institution has less capacity than 
the European Commission.  While the WTO Secretariat plays some role in agenda 
setting, much more is left up to the participating countries.  Thus the Secretariat is a 
less attractive entry point than is the European Commission.  In terms of actual policy 
creation and in terms of policy implementation, it is the governments that matter.  
Anyone who wants to influence the outcome of the negotiation process must, at some 
point, influence the states making the decisions. 
Advocacy groups have important strengths, relying in part on public perception.  They 
are seen as legitimate, as “do-gooders,” as fighting a “crusade,” according to one 
recent survey (Lombardo 2000).  They effectively exploit “politically correct” 
thinking, have strong economic support and high source credibility says the same 
report.  This can be compared to the low trust and confidence in governments and 
business. 
Advocacy group strategies span a range that includes the relatively peaceful provision 
of information to the potentially violent attempts to block WTO negotiations from 
even occurring.  One effective strategy during the agenda-setting stage is to obtain 
public support. Risse (2002) cites three potential strategies for this bargaining phase: 
1) lobbying in powerful domestic states (such as the EU or US); 2) creating a coalition 
with intergovernmental organizations; and 3) creating a coalition with smaller states, 
providing latter with knowledge and “information power.” Advocacy groups can play 
an important role in the implementation phase, influencing the direction of the actual 
policy itself.  To a certain extent this is the strength of such organizations as Amnesty 
International (for human rights) and Transparency International (for corruption). 
The CAP is facing increasing pressures for reform from its trading partners, from 
specific business interests, from advocacy groups, and because of its unsustainable 
impact on the EU budget.  Nevertheless, this does not mean that the CAP will quickly 
disappear, nor does it mean that those who wish for CAP reform are likely to get what 
they want.  Those interested in changing EU policy can learn from previous successes 
and failures.  The next three sections of the chapter describe some of these.  First, 
there are the interests of the farmers, who have demonstrated their ability over the 
years to gain disproportionate representation in the policy-making process.  Second, 
there is the increasingly adept manner in which food and beverage industry interests 
insert themselves into the policy-making process.  Finally, there are the varying 
experiences of advocacy groups.  There is, for instance, the recent experience of 
consumer groups who, acting on recent food safety crises, have been effective at 
making the CAP more responsive to their food safety concerns.  The quickness of the 
                                                 
27 This is similar in conception to Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) “norm life cycle” stages.  They find that, other things being 
equal, the influence of trans-national advocacy networks (the focus of their research) is generally greater during the first, 
agenda-setting phase. The networks also have some impact in the third phase, but it is more difficult for them to influence 
policy makers during the actual policy creation phase.  During implementation (as Risse 2002, also notes) the expertise and 
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EU response, arguably, came from the overwhelming force of public opinion and the 
cooperation of agriculture and industry once they realized that public concern could 
also impact their sales.  In some respects this contrasts with the experience of the 
animal welfare and environmental advocacy groups.  Long-term engagement with the 
EU policy process, and their links to powerful political parties (in the case of 
environmentalists), has been of great benefit to them. 
Box 9:  Farmers’ Organizations and the Food and Beverage Industry – A Clash of Interests. 
The strength of European farmers’ organizations and agricultural interests has been 
critical to the manner in which the CAP has developed over the decades and why 
efforts to reform the CAP have been so limited.  But what explains the extraordinary, 
continued success of a declining number of European farmers, combined with other 
agricultural interest groups, to obtain and maintain such favorable policies?  The short 
answer is that the groups directly benefiting from the CAP are very well organized and 
keenly focused on protecting their interests.  Those who pay for the CAP, taxpayers 
and consumers, are only indirectly affected by the CAP and do not have such cohesive, 
well organized groups promoting their interests.  Significant reform of the CAP would 
have a huge impact on EU farmers and agricultural interests, but it would have little 
direct influence on the many millions of European consumers and taxpayers. 
However, some key trends have reduced (and continue to reduce) the influence of 
farmers and their organizations in EU policy-making, particularly in northern Europe.  
Two additional factors appear to be weakening the traditional influence and clout of 
farmers.  The first is increased division among farmers regarding the CAP.  Farmers do 
not benefit equally from the CAP.  The Commission’s own figures suggest that roughly 
80% of total CAP financial support goes to only 20% of the farms.  In some member 
states, such as the UK, there seems to be clear evidence that larger farms do better 
with current policy.  One figure often quoted in the press was that the smallest 40% of 
Europe’s farms receive only 8% of the subsidies (Meade 2003).  A recent OECD report 
(2003b) has found this situation to be a general trend across OECD countries as 
agricultural subsidies fail to reach those who need them most.  Some small farmers 
came out in favor of CAP reform in 2003, not because they wanted to see the CAP 
undermined or abolished, but because they sought a more favorable outcome.  In many 
parts of Europe they allied themselves with rural groups and environmentalists who 
saw in these small farmers a way to “preserve the landscape”.
28  
Significantly, the food and beverage industry interests can run counter to those of 
farmers.  As it is in the food processing industry’s interest to secure low-cost inputs, 
reduced prices in agricultural products benefits them.
29 (Retailers, as buyers of 
agricultural products, also benefit from policy changes that reduce prices.)  Indeed, 
DG Enterprise represents the food industry and has identified two relevant barriers to 
EU industrial competitiveness: (a) high prices of domestic agricultural raw materials 
and (b) tariff and non-tariff barriers to third-country market access.  Both barriers 
have their roots in the CAP (DG Enterprise 2001). 
When considering trade policy preferences, business interests are often disaggregated 
into import-competing and export-oriented enterprises.  The typical expectation is 
that an import-competing enterprise will favor protectionist measures whereas the 
export-oriented enterprise will favor greater trade liberalization.  Roughly, this does 
                                                 
28 Rabinowicz 2000 provides one explanation as to why such coalitions may exist. For instance, in May 2002, the 
environmental and agricultural associations EURONATUR, the German Association for the Environment and Nature 
Conservation, and the German Small Farmers' Association announced a common platform for reform of EU agricultural 
policy (Federal Environmental Agency, 2002).  
29 At the EU level the Confederation of the Food and Drink Industries of the European Union (CIAA) represents most major 
European companies—including Nestle.  It is notable that just prior to the June 2003 Council of Agricultural Ministers 
meetings, the CIAA came out in support of CAP reform. 4. The Roles and Strategies of Interest Groups 
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describe differences between farmers (EU producers of primary agricultural products) 
and the EU food industry. 
However, while the interests of the food and beverage industry may at times run 
counter to those of farmers, it is not the case that their interests coincide with those 
of developing countries.  There are at least two issue areas where this is true.  First, it 
is the dairy processing industry that manufactures skimmed milk powder and receives 
the export subsidies that many advocacy groups claim hurt developing countries (see 
chapters 2 and 5).  Second, while the industry may wish to open the EU market to the 
raw agricultural products of developing countries, they also lobby the EU to restrict 
market access on processed or value-added goods.  Such “tariff escalation,” it has 
been argued, hampers the ability of developing countries to develop an industry that is 
complementary to their existing productive capabilities and that could contribute to 
poverty reduction (FAO 2003a). 
The Varying Impact of Advocacy Groups 
Advocacy groups promoting the interests of consumers, the environment, animal 
welfare and developing countries have had varying levels of impact on EU policy-
making related to the CAP.  Unlike business and farmer interests, advocacy groups 
attempt to influence policy-making to fit their typically ideological goals regarding the 
common good (Risse, 2002).  Another important difference is their orientation toward 
what Kohler-Koch (1997) calls the “functional segmentation” of the EU system.  That 
is, business and farmer interests tend to be fixed features in policy-making in a given 
issue area whereas advocacy groups tend to be more broad-based.  Such a difference 
could give business and farmer interests an advantage – for example, by 
institutionalized patterns of consultation. 
•  Consumers’ interests were little heard in previous efforts to achieve CAP reform.  
Recently, however, some attention was paid to consumer voices regarding food 
safety concerns.  While there is little evidence that the recent reform package 
will lead to lower food prices, it may well lead to safer food supplies.  The 
Consumer Association’s reaction to June 2003 CAP reform was that it was a “tragic 
missed opportunity” and once again the consumers will have to pay (Financial 
Times, 27 June 2003). 
The BSE crisis, and the attention consumers paid it, had a profound impact on 
agricultural policy in Germany.  The government replaced the Social Democrat 
agriculture minister, who supported conventional farming practices, with a new 
minister from the Green Party.  The new minister instituted major policy changes 
including support for organic farming and animal welfare.  Top officials in the 
ministry retired and the scientific advisory committee was dismissed. To reflect 
the new emphases and responsibilities, the ministry was renamed the Ministry for 
Consumer Protection, Nutrition and Agriculture (Schrader 2003). 
•  Environmental groups have had somewhat more success than consumers in 
achieving their CAP reform goals.  Largely due to the nature of the electoral 
systems, Green parties have a voice in most EU member states and in the 
European Parliament.  For example, it is clear that environmental concerns 
represented by the Green Party have played an influential role in changing the 
direction of agricultural policy and practice in Germany.  Green parties’ share of 
the vote in Europe is about 10%, and they have promoted environmental issues in 
other EU-15 countries and in the European Parliament. Many Europeans consider 
environmental issues particularly important, and the Green parties and a variety 
of advocacy groups promote their concerns. Environmentalists’ first direct success 
in CAP reform came with the MacSharry reforms of 1992 which, as discussed 4. The Roles and Strategies of Interest Groups 
34   
previously, created the second pillar of the CAP.  Agri-environmental policy was 
further advanced in the Agenda 2000 and June 2003 reforms. 
•  Animal welfare advocates have been active in Europe for many years, and they 
played a major role in the passage of a number of animal welfare-related 
conventions by the Council of Europe.  These advocacy groups focus intense 
efforts on a narrow range of issues, a key reason they have had much greater 
impact on EU policy-making than consumers and taxpayers. Although animal 
welfare issues within Europe do not yet directly impact developing countries that 
export animal products to the EU, this situation appears to be changing.  The EU 
itself has lobbied for the inclusion of animal welfare issues as non-trade concerns 
on the WTO agenda for the Doha Round. 
•  Pro-developing country advocacy groups have become very visible in recent 
years in their interrelated efforts to reform the CAP and promote fair trade. 
Several of the NGOs concerned have established groups to strengthen their 
advocacy efforts.  The groups include Eurostep, based in Brussels and comprised of 
over 20 European NGOs, and the Trade Justice Movement made up of British NGOs. 
Oxfam International, a confederation of 12 development agencies which work in 
120 countries throughout the developing world, has offices in Brussels, Geneva, 
New York and an advocacy office in Washington DC.  
Oxfam’s success in making its positions widely known is a result of its work and 
lobbying at all four relevant levels: EU member states, the EU itself, the 
international level, and in developing countries.  In 2003 three interest groups 
advocating very different issues formed an alliance in their efforts to promote 
reform of the CAP: (1) Oxfam, pro-developing country; (2) World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF), environmental issues; and (3) the BEUC.  This kind of alliance between 
advocacy groups representing very different constituencies and interests may 
prove to be significant in future efforts to reform the CAP. 
For several years the EU has argued that it has responded to many of these societal 
concerns by modifying the CAP.  DG Agriculture described the Agenda 2000 reforms as 
driven by the need to: (a) make the EU farm sector more competitive in the face of 
increasingly open global trading regimes; (b) respond to society’s concerns about the 
relationship between farming and the environment; and (c) develop new strategies 
aimed at promoting the economic potential of the rural areas  (DG Agriculture 2002b).  
DG Agriculture described the June 2003 CAP reform as: (a) geared towards consumers’ 
and taxpayers’ interests while continuing to assist farmers; (b) safeguarding the rural 
economy and environment; (c) keeping budgetary costs stable and manageable; and 
(d) helping in negotiating a WTO agriculture agreement that meets the needs of EU 
agriculture and society.  It announced that EU consumers and taxpayers would receive 
more transparency and better value for their money.  All farmers receiving direct 
payments will become subject to “compulsory cross-compliance” under which a 
priority list of 18 statutory European standards in the fields of environment, food 
safety, and animal health and welfare have been established.  Farmers will be 
sanctioned if they do not respect the standards (DG Agriculture 2003c). 
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5. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ISSUES 
The European Union plays a major role in the global trade of LLPs. The Doha Round of 
multilateral trade negotiations is particularly relevant to EU policy-making regarding 
its Common Agricultural Policy.  In 2003 the Doha negotiations on agriculture 
essentially forced the EU to reform the CAP in order to strengthen the EU’s 
negotiating position before the September 2003 WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancun.  
This chapter examines the EU’s international trade in beef and dairy and discusses the 
EU’s policy-making process concerning international agricultural trade.  For the 
purposes of this study, four categories of developing countries are identified and their 
v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  t h e  D o h a  R o und noted.  Brief answers are provided 
regarding whether the poor in developing countries can expect to benefit from trade 
liberalization in beef and dairy, and the impact of SPS standards on poor LLP 
producers in developing countries is examined.  
EU Trade in Beef and Dairy 
Approximately one-fifth of world trade involves the European Union.  In terms of 
agricultural products, the EU is the world’s largest importer and second largest 
exporter (WTO 2003).  As noted in chapter 1, from 1997-2001 the EU was the largest 
producer of key dairy products (milk, butter, skimmed milk powder and whole milk 
powder) and the second largest producer of beef and veal.  Table 5 below shows the 
EU’s share of global trade in several LLPs for the year 2000 (excluding intra-EU trade).  
In only one commodity, milk, did the EU import more than it exported.  In contrast, 
the EU dominated international trade in milk powder. 
Table 5:  The EU Share of the World Market in 2000. 























Fresh milk  583,701     838    0.1  35.9  22.8  -13.1 
Butter      7,313     824  11.3  13.5  21.2    7.6 
Cheese    16,417  1,423    8.7  11.6  35.8  24.2 
Milk powder 
(skimmed & whole)      5,933  2,859  48.2    3.3  32.5  29.2 
Total meat (except 
offal), including:  233,536  17,164    7.3    7.5  16.6    9.2 
 - Beef and veal    56,684    5,717  10.1    6.7  10.9    4.2 
 - Pigmeat    89,712    3,289    3.7    1.9  36.1  34.2 
 - Poultrymeat    68,405    7,143  10.4    5.4  14.3    8.9 
Eggs    55,518       481    0.9    5.0  19.1  14.1 
Source:  European Commission (January 2003) 
aExports (excluding intra-EU trade) and excluding processed products 
bNet balance EU trade/world trade 
EU global market shares in 2000 for dairy, meat and meat preparations, and for live 
animals were close to what they had been in 1991 (EC 2002).  But during the 1990s the 5. International Trade Issues 
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EU achieved its most positive trade balances in these commodities, after climbing 
from low bases in 1967.  
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Because of the CAP and related EU trade policies, as noted in chapter 2, there have 
been serious charges against the EU of restricting market access.  The EU response to 
such charges includes the point that in 2000 the EU’s imports from developing 
countries were nearly € 36 billion, more than the total average imports from 
developing countries into the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand 
combined (EC 2003b).  It also pointed out that  “The EU absorbs around 85% of Africa’s 
agricultural exports and 45% of Latin America’s, and it is the largest importer of 
agricultural products from LDCs” (EC 2003b).  The information in Tables 6 and 7 
clearly demonstrates that developing countries as a category export far more beef to 
the EU than do developed countries and that during the 1990s the EU exported large 
amounts of beef to developing countries (a situation which has changed dramatically 
in 2001).  As discussed below, well over 80% of the beef the EU imported from 
developing countries between 1990-2001 came from Latin America. 
In its defence the EU also points to its Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative adopted in 
March 2001.  The EBA provides tariff- and quota-free access to the EU market for 49 
LDCs.  There is no doubt that the EBA is an important step in assisting poor developing 
countries.  However, critics charge that the EU has delayed the elimination of import 
restrictions for commodities particularly important to LDC trade, including bananas, 
sugar, and rice.
30  
Table 6:   Share of EU Beef Imports (%). 




24.3  19.1 17.0 17.2 15.3 13.4 15.7 15.5 16.2 13.8  9.6  11.4 
Developing, including:  75.7  80.9 83.0 82.8 84.7 86.6 84.3 84.5 83.8 86.2 90.4 88.6 
-  Africa  Dev.ing      7.3  11.7 13.1 16.2 16.8 15.8 12.9 14.1 14.4 12.4 11.3 15.5 
- Asia Dev.ing    0.4    0.1    0.2    0.2    0.1    0.1    0.3    0.2    0.1    0.1    0.2    0.4 
-  America  Dev.ing  91.9  88.2 86.7 83.5 83.1 83.9 83.2 83.2 84.5 87.3 88.4 83.7 
LDC    0.0    0.0    0.2    0.4    0.4    0.8    0.4    0.2    0.1    0.0    0.0    0.0 
EU Candidate 
Accession    7.9    6.3    6.5    6.6    6.2    4.4    4.3    4.0    4.9    4.8    4.5    4.7 
Source: FAO 2003b 
                                                 
30 The EU has also included safeguard provisions for such products that involve reintroducing higher tariffs on imports 
originating from a developing country if such imports cause serious disruption to EU markets. 5. International Trade Issues 
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Table 7:  Share of EU Beef Exports (%). 
Share of total 




42.9 50.6 42.5 38.2 42.0 44.6 53.6 59.2 51.8 57.6 36.4 75.9 
Developing, 
including:  57.1 49.4 57.5 61.8 58.0 55.4 46.4 40.8 48.2 42.4 63.6 24.1 
 - Africa 
Dev.ing  32.0 37.4 46.0 43.6 41.4 41.7 43.9 49.8 55.2 60.9 48.5 27.9 
  -  Asia  Dev.ing 55.1 34.1 40.6 44.6 47.1 46.9 41.2 43.9 39.4 33.8 38.0 31.4 
 - America 
Dev.ing    8.7  13.5  12.3    9.4    8.8    8.7    7.0    2.2    2.5    2.4    2.7    3.6 
LDC    3.6    4.2    4.9    4.0    3.3    2.5    2.4    2.1    1.9    1.7    3.9    3.3 
EU Candidate 
Accession    2.1    4.7    6.9    6.8    8.9    5.7    4.2    3.9    4.2    2.8    5.2    2.6 
Source: FAO 2003b 
EU Policy-Making Regarding International Trade 
The analytic approach taken in the present study to EU policy-making regarding 
international trade parallels the three-level framework used in regard to the CAP in 
chapter 3.  On the far left-hand side of Figure 6 are the EU Member States (the first 
level of analysis).  Their governments provide the key decision makers, including the 
members of the EU’s Council of Ministers and the national trade officials that sit on 
the EU’s “Article 133 Committee.”  At the member state level, various bodies debate 
the objectives to be achieved during negotiations, press for specific aims and approve 
agreements.  Within member states, various ministries formulate their trade goals. 
The divisions among the EU-15 regarding international agricultural trade are similar to 
those regarding the CAP discussed in chapter 3.  A key reason is that the CAP includes 
the most important items on the agricultural trade agenda.  Parallel to its defence of 
the CAP, France is a strong voice in the EU against significant change in current WTO 
rules on global agricultural trade.  During the Uruguay Round, France was a major 
reason for the near collapse of the negotiations (Swinback and Tanner 1996). 
Within the EU (the second level of analysis), the decision-making process regarding 
trade policy resembles that for the CAP.  The Commission is charged with developing 
the proposals, and the Council of Ministers makes decisions based on these 
proposals.
31  A key difference is that the Commission plays an additional external role 
as trade negotiator.  Within the Commission, DG Trade takes the lead role and 
                                                 
31 The Council of Ministers formally determines the EU’s negotiating ‘mandate,’ using qualified majority voting (see Chapter 
3). Unanimity is required in certain cases. For instance, Article 133, paragraph 6 of the EEC Treaty includes the clause: 
“agreements relating to trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health 
services, shall fall within the shared competence of the Community and its Member States… such agreements shall 
require the common accord of the Member States.”  5. International Trade Issues 
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coordinates activities, although other DGs are actively involved in the policy areas 
related to their interests.  In the ongoing Doha Round of agricultural trade 
negotiations, DG Agriculture and DG Enterprise (representing food and beverage 
industry interests), among others, are playing active roles.
32  The current arrangement 
represents a significant change as during the GATT negotiations DG Agriculture was 
the lead DG representing EC interests regarding agricultural trade, whereas in all 
other areas the DG External Affairs exercised lead responsibility during these 
negotiations (the role currently played by DG Trade).  The European Parliament 
occasionally plays a role in the current EU policy-making process regarding 
international trade, as its assent may be required to conclude a trade agreement (see 
Article 300 of the EEC Treaty). 
Interest groups actively lobby member state governments and EU-level institutions 
regarding their trade policy concerns.  Most of the EU interest groups concerned with 
reform of agricultural trade policy are the same as those interested in CAP reform, 
and they tend to pursue the same strategies described in chapter 3.  At the EU level, 
some of this activity is institutionalized.  In the Commission’s words, it “implements a 
policy of transparency and broad, open dialogue with stakeholders, inter alia, by 
organizing regular meeting sessions with representatives of interest groups and civil 
society including representatives from industry, the social partners and the NGO 
community” (WTO 2002b). 
The Doha Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
All European Union trade agreements, including those granting preferential access to 
EU markets to specific countries and groups of countries, are governed by rules 
formulated within the context of the WTO.  Established in 1995 with the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round of the GATT, the WTO aims to function as a facilitator to achieve 
multilateral agreement on international trade issues.  The WTO also provides a 
mechanism for member countries to resolve trade disputes.  Currently, the WTO is 
coordinating the Doha Round of trade negotiations launched in November 2001. 
 
                                                 
32 Another difference is that both Council and Commission share the responsibility of ensuring compatibility between 
international agreements and internal law.  Article 113 (now 133) of the EEC Treaty that establishes these competencies 
also calls for the formation of a ‘special committee,’ now known as the Article 133 Committee, to facilitate this Council-
Commission relationship. 5. International Trade Issues 
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The Uruguay Round was the first round of multilateral trade negotiations to 
effectively include the agricultural sector.  In so doing it created the framework for 
current negotiations, was the inspiration for one of the most important current trade 
alliances (the Cairns Group), and was a transition point for developing-country 
participation in the GATT/WTO regime.  Concerning agriculture, the Uruguay Round 
produced four key agreements: the Agreement on Agriculture; the set of concessions 
and commitments of member states to three pillars of agricultural trade reform; a 
Ministerial  Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the 
Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing 
Countries; and an Agreement on SPS. 
The current Doha Round of agricultural negotiations aims to achieve significant 
breakthroughs on the “three pillars” set out in the Agreement on Agriculture:  
•  substantial improvements in market access (reductions in tariffs) 
•  reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies  
•  substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.   
Developing countries were disappointed by the results of the Uruguay Round, and they 
made increased liberalization of agricultural trade their top priority in the current 
round.  Only major advances in agricultural trade issues will make it possible for the 
Doha Round to fulfil its claim to be a “development round.”  The Doha Round is a 
“single undertaking” in which nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.  If there is 
no agreement on agriculture, the entire round will be in jeopardy.  There is a looming 
threat as the Uruguay Round produced a “peace clause” under which agricultural 
trade disputes were taken off the negotiating table.  The peace clause expired on 31 
December 2003, and several sensitive trade disputes could flare up. 
Virtually no progress has been made in the multilateral agricultural negotiations in the 
nearly two years since the Doha Round began. 
33  Those involved in the agricultural 
negotiations at the WTO in Geneva were not even able to reach agreement on the 
“modalities”
34 for the talks by the deadline of 31 March 2003.  The differences 
between the positions of the various countries and trading groups were too great to be 
effectively bridged.  The agricultural negotiations made little progress in subsequent 
months.  During this period, most of the blame for the lack of progress was directed at 
the EU for its failure to significantly reform the CAP. 
There was intense pressure on the EU to reform the CAP from both developed and 
developing countries involved in the Doha Round negotiations.  This pressure was 
directed at the EU in general, and at the Commission and at the 15 Member States.  
When the ministers of agriculture from the EU-15 member states met in June 2003 
they were confronted with the fact that if the CAP were not effectively reformed the 
EU would be in an extremely weak bargaining position at the September 2003 WTO 
Ministerial meeting in Cancun.  A key argument was that the EU needed to change the 
CAP so that the EU could conform to proposals regarding domestic support made by 
the chairman of the WTO agricultural negotiations in Geneva.  The Council of Ministers 
finally agreed on reform of the CAP on 26 June, after failing to reach agreement in 
full council meetings during the previous weeks.  If it were not for the intense 
pressure resulting from the Doha Round, it is unlikely that the CAP would have been 
modified to the extent it was. 
The June 2003 CAP reform directly addressed only the third pillar of the Doha 
agricultural negotiations.  By breaking the link between subsidies and production, 
                                                 
33 As the research for this report ended in August 2003, the WTO Ministerial Meeting held in Cancun in September 2003 is not 
covered. 
34 “Modalities” are basic positions by the negotiating parties involved which provide the framework within which negotiations 
are conducted.  Modalities for these negotiations cover, for example, tariff reduction formulas. 5. International Trade Issues 
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under WTO rules the EU will be able to shift its domestic agricultural support from a 
“trade distorting” category to a “non-trade distorting” category.  The reform did not 
directly address market access, the first pillar, or export subsidies, the second pillar.  
Critics concluded that the reforms agreed were inadequate, and it was widely noted 
that the result of the negotiations was a diluted version of the Agricultural 
Commissioner’s proposals.  The Economist wrote that the EU’s farm reforms may have 
been radical by the Commission's “undemanding standards but will not be enough to 
satisfy the rest of the world,“ and that the reforms of the “EU’s insane farm policies” 
needed to go a lot further and faster (Economist 28 June 2003). 
There is another very important link between the recent CAP reform and the Doha 
Round of agriculture talks.  When the EU agriculture ministers agreed to reform the 
CAP at the end of June 2003, they established political guidelines that set the subsidy 
cuts they approved as the Commission’s outer limit for the Doha Round of WTO 
agriculture negotiations.  The Council of Ministers stressed that the “margin of 
manoeuvre” in the Doha negotiations provided by the CAP reform “can only be used 
on condition of equivalent agricultural concessions from our WTO partners.”  The EU 
pointedly noted that the fact that it had made its reforms early in the negotiating 
process did not mean it would make additional concessions (Inside US Trade 4 July 
2003, EU 2003a). 
To some degree, the EU’s political guidelines based on the CAP reform may have been 
a bargaining tactic during the Doha Round.  But there was certainly strong resistance 
by some member states to agree during the Doha negotiations to any concessions 
beyond those allowed by the June CAP reform.  Under the circumstances, it will be a 
difficult challenge for those trying to successfully conclude the overall Doha Round of 
negotiations to convince France and some other member states to make further 
concessions on agriculture.  However, the collapse of the talks at Cancun in 
September 2003 may well provide an opportunity for pro-reform EU member states to 
re-open discussion at a later date on these issues.
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Further negotiations on agriculture during the Doha Round represent the best 
possibility of reforming the CAP in ways that could benefit developing countries in 
general and enhance efforts to utilize livestock to help reduce poverty in developing 
countries.  Multilateral trade negotiations represent the most important and effective 
way for non-EU actors to influence EU agricultural and trade policy.  Such negotiations 
are particularly important for developing countries as, with a few key exceptions 
(including the newly created Group of 21), they have very limited influence in 
bilateral trade negotiations with the EU and other developed countries. 
It is also significant that multilateral negotiations and hence CAP reform can be driven 
by factors that have little to do with agriculture.  During the Uruguay Round it has 
been suggested that business interests in France seeking to achieve their own 
objectives pressured the French government of the time to give in to demands for CAP 
reform so that the round could be completed under the “single undertaking” rule.  In 
2003 many observers concluded even before the failure of the September WTO 
ministerial meeting in Cancun that one component of overall EU strategy during the 
Doha Round of trade talks included linking any agreement to further liberalize 
agriculture to developing country agreement for negotiations on investment and the 
other “Singapore issues”  (competition rules, transparency in government 
procurement and trade facilitation).  While during the Uruguay Round non-agricultural 
factors appear to have played a key role in producing agreement and promoting CAP 
reform, the EU’s insistence on the Singapore issues during the Cancun meeting is 
widely regarded as one of the reasons for the collapse of the talks. 
                                                 
35 Update: in November 2003 the Commission sent an official Communication to the Council, the European Parliament, and to 
the Economic and Social Committee entitled “Reviving the Doha Development Agenda Negotiations – the EU Perspective” 
(European Commission, 2003c).  Several of the parties involved, including the EU, US and developing countries, have 
expressed strong interest in reviving the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. 5. International Trade Issues 
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Trade with Developing Countries 
Developing countries make up over three-quarters of the WTO membership.  It is up to 
each WTO member country itself to declare if it is a developing country.  There are 
enormous differences between the various developing countries in terms of 
population, levels of development, standards of living, kinds and importance of 
agricultural trade, degree of involvement in WTO negotiations, negotiating power and 
skill, and many other factors.  This section presents four categories of developing 
countries identified for the purposes of the study and assesses critics’ charges that the 
EU dumped beef and milk in Africa.  It explains who is expected to gain and lose from 
trade liberalization. 
Four categories of developing countries 
There are well over 100 developing countries at very different levels of development 
and with enormous differences between them, as noted above.  For the purposes of 
this study, four partially overlapping categories of developing countries are identified: 
1. South American countries that are major beef exporters (four countries);  
2. the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries as a group (77 countries);  
3. African countries exporting beef to the EU on preferential terms (six countries);  
4. the least developed countries (LDCs, 49 countries). 
Category 1. The first category is made up of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.  
These four South American countries are major beef exporters and the main suppliers 
of imported beef in the EU, as shown in Tables 6 and 7.  Brazil and Argentina play 
prominent roles in international trade and trade negotiations.  Brazil has a large, 
diversified agricultural sector, and its current capacity – and future potential – as an 
agricultural exporter seems to clearly worry the EU in general and some of the EU 
member states in particular.  Argentina has a worldwide reputation for high levels of 
beef production, consumption and export.  It is well known in some European 
countries for the exceptionally high quality of the beef it exports and for “Argentine 
restaurants” specializing in beef.  These four countries: (a) make up Mercosur, also 
known as the Common Market of the South, established in 1991; and (b) are members 
of the Cairns group, the strongest advocate of trade liberalization during the Doha 
Round. In addition, three are members of the Group of 21.  The chairman of the 
Group of 21 is Brazil’s Foreign Minister, who previously served as Brazil’s ambassador 
to the WTO.  The high level of LLP exports and negotiating influence of these four 
South American developing countries is in sharp contrast to the situation of the other 
three categories identified here. 
Category 2. The ACP countries were selected as the second category because they 
represent 77 largely poor, developing countries with preferential trade access to and 
other special treatment from the EU. It was primarily in ACP countries where the EU 
(a) dumped subsidized beef exports and thereby destabilized beef production and 
marketing in West and Southern Africa, and (b) dumped (and continues to dump) 
subsidized exports of powdered milk, thereby undermining dairy production in 
developing countries. Most of the current 77 ACP countries are former colonies with 
strong economic and other ties to their former colonial powers. For many years the 
ACP countries have had a special relationship with the EU.  Under the Lomé 
Convention signed in Togo in 1975, and its successor treaties, the EC/EU has provided 
a preferential trade regime, support to stabilize export earnings, financial and 
technical assistance, and industrial cooperation. The Cotonou Agreement signed in 
June 2000 superseded the Lome Agreement and provides a new framework for the 
preferential trade relationships and development assistance activities.  In 2000 the 
trade relationship between the EU and ACP states represented only 4% of EU imports 5. International Trade Issues 
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a n d  e x p o r t s ,  i n  t e r m s  o f  v a l u e .   A l t h o u gh trade with ACP countries may not be 
particularly significant from the perspective of the EU, the preferential trade access 
to the EU market is extremely important to the ACP states concerned. 
Category 3. The third category is made up of six African ACP countries with the right 
to export beef and veal to the EU on preferential conditions under a special protocol.  
Listed in order of the size of their quota the countries, they are: Botswana, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Swaziland and Kenya.  EU imports of beef and veal from these 
six countries amount to about 3% of the total in value terms and about 2.3% in 
volume.  (No recent imports were registered for Madagascar or Kenya.) Although the 
amounts of beef and veal involved represent a relatively insignificant proportion of 
total EU imports of these commodities, as is the case for ACP countries in general, 
access to the EU market is very important for these African beef-exporting countries.  
The high-quality cuts of beef allowed under the protocol command premium prices in 
the EU, much higher than the EU intervention price for beef.  There is only a limited 
supply of beef that meets the EU’s high quality and SPS requirements produced in the 
southern African countries concerned. Currently only two southern African countries 
(Botswana and Namibia) significantly benefit from this protocol, with small benefits 
going to Zimbabwe (until recently a major beneficiary) and Swaziland. 
Category 4. In the fourth category are the 49 LDCs (as defined by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development) recognized by the WTO as deserving special 
consideration.  Most of them are located in Africa and several are not members of the 
WTO.  All WTO agreements contain special provisions for developing countries, and 
LDCs receive additional consideration and treatment.  The provisions include longer 
time periods to implement agreements and commitments, measures to increase their 
trading opportunities, and support to help them build the infrastructure for WTO 
work, handle disputes and implement technical standards.  As shown in tables 6 and 7, 
between 1990-2001 LDCs exported virtually no beef to the EU and imported about 3% 
of total EU beef exports. 
The WTO also recognizes another category deserving special consideration, the net 
food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs), currently numbering 23 (not all NFIDCs 
a r e  L D C s ) .   I t  i s  w i d e l y  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  t h e liberalization of trade in agricultural 
products, particularly reductions, and the possible elimination, of export subsidies, 
m a y  i n c r e a s e  w o r l d  f o o d  p r i c e s .   N F I D C s  c o u l d  b e  s e v e r e l y  a f f e c t e d  b y  s u c h  p r i c e  
increases, which could even threaten their food security.  The situation of the poor in 
these countries could deteriorate. 
Very Different Goals during the Doha Round 
The Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations is very important to all four 
categories of developing countries, but the different categories also have different 
objectives in the negotiations.  The South American beef exporting countries are 
leading proponents of liberalizing international agricultural trade. They have strong 
reasons for their position.  The results of simulation studies using the Global Meat 
Industry model indicate that, of the world’s beef exporting nations, the countries in 
our first category would be the main beneficiaries of the elimination of EU export 
subsidies for beef and the reduction by the EU of domestic production subsidies to its 
beef producers (MLA 2002, 2003). 
The ACP countries are determined to defend their arrangements with the EU that 
provide them with preferential access to the European market.  They point to the fact 
that agriculture is critical to their economic development, and that progress on 
agricultural issues in the Doha Round of trade talks “holds the potential to lift millions 
of people out of poverty” (Financial Times, 4 August 2003).  ACP countries also want 
to strengthen the existing provisions provided to developing countries for special and 
differential treatment. They urge developed countries to reduce agricultural trade 5. International Trade Issues 
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barriers, eliminate export subsidies for agricultural products, and strengthen 
provisions that enable poorer countries to shield domestic markets from foreign 
competition.   
Southern African exporters of beef view their preferential access to the lucrative EU 
market under the beef protocol as very important and worry about the implications of 
the current Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  They have identified 
several positive features, in particular guaranteed high prices and greatly reduced 
duties, and are in favor of maintaining and improving the current arrangement. There 
are indications that these beef exporters are also concerned that reform of the CAP 
over the past decade has reduced their profit margins. The main ACP exporters of 
beef to EU have been Botswana, Namibia and Zimbabwe.  (The beef protocol does not 
allow additional beef-producing countries to enter the market on similarly favorable 
terms, and it was not possible to determine the degree of support for the few 
countries benefiting from the beef protocol on the part of other ACP countries.) 
The LDCs tend to share the concerns of the ACP group.  One key reason for this 
similarity of interests is that 39 of the 49 recognized LDCs are themselves ACP 
countries.  
Will Poor Developing Country Beef Producers Benefit from Increased 
Access to the EU Market? 
If greater access to the EU market for beef is achieved as a result of the Doha Round 
of negotiations, in the view of those interviewed on the subject and of the authors of 
this report, only those countries currently exporting beef to the EU will be able to 
take advantage of the liberalized situation and export greater amounts of beef.  There 
are two key reasons: (1) the SPS standards required by the EU; and (2) the high quality 
of beef demanded by European consumers. 
Among developing countries, the current beef-exporting countries in South America 
will be the greatest beneficiaries of future liberalization in the international beef 
trade.  Of all countries, the most successful current beef suppliers to the EU are 
Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil.  The production and export of beef from these South 
American countries are dominated by large-scale producers that reportedly benefit 
from various government policies providing favorable access to credit and land.
36  In 
regard to the southern African countries, the beef and veal exported to the EU is very 
high quality and commands premium prices on the lucrative European market.  The 
major beneficiaries of beef exported to the EU are those large-scale cattle ranchers 
capable of producing the high quality meat required, as well as others involved in beef 
processing and export.  It is significant that no one interviewed during the course of 
the present study was convinced that poor beef producers in the South American or 
southern African countries concerned would benefit directly from their country’s 
increased access to the EU beef market.  It is possible, however, that increased beef 
exports to the EU from these developing countries could indirectly help reduce 
poverty by generating employment, income or other benefits.  It is also possible that 
increased exports might open domestic markets to lower-quality beef produced by the 
poor, although high-quality beef that meets international SPS standards could be 
exported to markets other than the EU if greater access to the EU market was not 
achieved. 
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Will the Poor in Developing Countries Benefit from the Liberalization of 
Trade in Dairy Products? 
A frequent response to this question from those interviewed was that if world trade 
were liberalized in regard to dairy products, the main beneficiary would be New 
Zealand, followed by Australia, the United States and other countries.  The EU, 
however, is not expected to gain.  It is particularly relevant that the New Zealand 
company Fontera accounts for over 30% of the world’s net dairy trade (Norgate 2003).  
A recent OECD (2003c) report suggests that New Zealand should be able to increase its 
milk production by 26% in 2008, while EU exports of dairy products (especially 
skimmed milk powder) are expected to fall.  The OECD makes the specific argument 
that the EU is losing market share directly to Oceania.  
New Zealand produces dairy products very efficiently and without subsidies, but that 
is not the case for many other developed countries that heavily subsidize dairy 
products.  An IFPRI report concluded that the Uruguay Round’s Agreement on 
Agriculture has had very little effect when judged purely on the basis of the level of 
domestic support for agriculture in general and the dairy sector in particular.   
Domestic support levels for dairy products in the EU and the US were as high in the 
second half of the 1990s as in the 1986-1988 base period (Sharma and Gulati 2003). 
A senior advisor in the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Nature Management and 
Fisheries, Gerrit Meester, carried out a study with a colleague on the effects of trade 
liberalization and EU enlargement on the Dutch agricultural sector (Massink and 
Meester 2002).  In the course of this study he found that it was not likely that free 
trade conditions would create additional opportunities for developing countries in 
European markets (personal communication, April 2003).  Some interviewed argued 
that, if trade in dairy products is liberalized, it would be extremely difficult for poor 
producers in developing countries to compete effectively with foreign companies such 
as New Zealand’s Fontera in regional markets and, in some cases, even in their home 
country market.
37 
The Impact of Sanitary & Phytosanitary Standards and Quality 
Requirements on Poor LLP Producers in Developing Countries 
A significant result of the Uruguay Round in regard to trade in LLPs was the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (see Annex 4).  The SPS 
agreement aims to provide several functions for WTO members, including: 
•  greater harmonization, transparency and equivalence among member states with 
regard to SPS standards 
•  the information resources necessary to make decisions regarding SPS issues 
•  protection from scientifically unjustifiable SPS measures 
•  a more efficient process for handling trade disputes related to such concerns, by 
handling these concerns through the SPS Committee. 
Provisions were also made to take into account the special needs of developing 
countries, but the points discussed below demonstrate that these special needs have 
not yet been met. 
As a consequence of high SPS standards and quality requirements, most poor 
developing-country producers of LLPs have very little opportunity to export their 
products to the EU market.  A key example is beef and veal producers. Greater or 
even unrestricted access to the EU beef market would not directly benefit poor 
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producers in developing countries because they cannot meet current SPS standards 
and quality requirements.  Quality is an essential factor because EU customers want 
quality and are willing to pay for it, especially after the BSE and other food safety 
crises of the 1990s, and the Commission and member states clearly recognize their 
obligations to protect their citizens.  Under the EBA initiative the EU already grants 
LDCs complete market access at zero duty for beef, but the producers cannot meet 
the quality and SPS standards.  And there is little likelihood that poor developing-
country livestock producers will be able to meet these standards any time in the near 
future.  Even the better-off southern African beef exporters are concerned by the 
combination of declining EU prices and the additional costs of exporting beef to the 
EU market associated with meeting stricter SPS standards. 
Obstacles to Compliance with SPS Standards 
Developing countries assumed significant obligations as a result of the Uruguay Round 
decisions on SPS measures, but the WTO regulations reflect inadequate understanding 
of the development problems and limited capacity of developing countries to 
implement these standards.  There was little concern for how much implementation 
would cost, how it would be done and whether it would actually promote 
development.  As a result of the Uruguay Round, according to Finger and Schuler 
(2002), developing countries took on bound commitments to implement the SPS 
agreement in exchange for unbound commitments of assistance from developed 
countries. 
Although the SPS agreement provides governments the right to restrict trade in order 
to protect human, animal, or plant life or health, it limits this right in efforts to 
prevent disguised restrictions on trade. For a developing country to effectively use the 
WTO SPS agreement to defend its export rights or justify restricting imports, it will 
need to upgrade its own SPS system to international standards.  Such developing 
countries will need to meet international standards similar to those already in place in 
developed countries, which have been in the forefront of establishing the 
international standards.  “Although the SPS agreement does not require that a 
country’s  domestic standards meet the agreement’s requirements, it does require 
that the standards the country applies at the border meet those requirements” 
(Finger and Schuler 2002). 
It will be very expensive for developing countries develop the capacity to meet and 
demonstrate compliance with these standards.  To export LLPs would require 
upgrading central and field-level veterinary services, establishing or upgrading 
laboratories and quarantine stations, improvements in slaughter facilities and 
processing plants, certification of disease-free zones, border inspection posts, and 
increased training and staff.  Producers themselves will have to meet the costs of 
complying with certain international SPS regulations.  If international SPS standards 
are applied in traditional regional markets, countries exporting to those markets that 
are unable to comply -- or unable to demonstrate compliance -- with these standards 
may encounter serious restrictions on their trade. 
The expense involved in upgrading often weak existing systems to the international 
level raises serious questions in some cases about whether developing the capacity to 
meet international SPS standards is really in the best interests of certain poor 
developing countries. Some of the many other needs of poor countries may have 
higher priority for the limited resources available.  
The EC has proposed drafting even stricter SPS standards that would cover both 
European products and imported products from third countries.  It is recognized that 
developing countries, particularly ACP countries, would be particularly affected as 
most would have difficulty complying with even higher standards for exports of 
agricultural products to the EU. 5. International Trade Issues 
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Domestic and regional markets are currently very important for many poor livestock 
producers in developing countries.  Given that demand for LLPs in developing 
countries is expected to increase considerably in the next two decades, these 
domestic and regional markets should become even more important.  EU policies and 
activities that affect these markets are therefore extremely significant.  If subsidized 
exports of EU beef dominate the Middle East and North African markets in the future, 
for example, this could foreclose or reduce trade opportunities for poor African 
countries.  Generations of poor Eastern African livestock producers have exported 
sheep, goats and cattle to Saudi Arabia and nearby countries.  This long-standing 
practice is threatened by (among other factors) concerns about livestock disease 
transmission and increasingly stringent SPS measures based on developed-country 
requirements and practices.  In addition, if trade in beef is liberalized as a result of 
multilateral negotiations, South American countries, Australia and New Zealand could 
increase their share of developing-country markets, including the Middle East and 
North Africa.  It will not be easy for poor developing country livestock producers to 
benefit from trade in livestock and livestock products to markets that require 
international SPS standards. 
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6. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study analysed the political economy of EU policy-making with regard to EU trade 
in beef and dairy with developing countries.  Previous reforms of the CAP have been 
central to the making of relevant agriculture and trade policies.  For many years the 
EU’s trade policies have been regulated by multilateral trade agreements; since 1995 
by the WTO’s multilateral rules, particularly the Agreement on Agriculture.  Future 
change of relevant EU agriculture and trade policy affecting developing countries will 
require additional reform of the CAP, and CAP reform itself will be affected by and 
linked to future multilateral trade negotiations.  The way the EU makes its agriculture 
and trade policies involves three levels: the EU member state, the EU itself, and the 
international trading system. The present study also considered a fourth “level,” 
developing countries, that is affected by EU policy-making. 
The numerous developing countries have different needs and interests with respect to 
trade issues, a reflection of the enormous differences between them in regard to 
population, resources, current (and potential) involvement in international trade, 
negotiating experience and capacity, and other factors. EU policies regarding trade in 
beef and dairy have different impacts on the different categories of developing 
countries, and this leads to very different responses. Developing countries comprise 
more than 75% of WTO membership, and each WTO member itself declares if it is a 
developing country.  For the purposes of this study, four overlapping categories of 
developing countries were identified. 
EU Policies and Developing Countries – the Three Pillars 
The following examination of EU policies concerning trade in beef and dairy between 
the EU and developing countries focuses on the “three pillars” of agricultural trade 
reform of the WTO’s Doha Round of trade negotiations: 
•  reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies  
•  substantial improvements in market access (reductions in tariffs) 
•  substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. 
The June 2003 CAP reform addressed only trade-distorting domestic support, the third 
pillar.  The reform did not directly address export subsidies or market access.  Nor did 
the reform address the total amount of support going to agriculture, and, as a result, 
expenditure on the CAP still represents nearly half the total EU budget.  When the 
Council of Agriculture Ministers finally reached agreement to reform the CAP in June 
2003, the link to the ongoing WTO trade talks was explicitly described in the press 
release with the explanation that the reform would strengthen the EU’s negotiating 
hand and that the old subsidy system significantly distorted international trade and 
harmed developing countries (EU Institutions Press Release: Luxembourg 26 June 
2003).  It is remarkable that the EU publicly admitted that the CAP had caused serious 
problems to international trade and developing countries.  On the other hand, while 
the reforms agreed to last June were an important step, they were so limited that 
they are unlikely to overcome key problems raised by critics of the CAP. 
Numerous OECD countries have been criticized for their support to agriculture and 
related trade policies.  This report focuses on the EU.  The interrelationships between 
- and the effects of the combination of - the three pillars of WTO efforts at 
agriculture reform are very important, for example in lowering world prices of beef 
and dairy products.  Such reduced prices can themselves undermine production efforts 
and livelihoods in developing countries.  For analytic purposes, however, the three 
pillars are discussed separately below. 6. Summary and Recommendations 
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The first pillar. Earlier chapters presented criticisms from various sources concerning 
EU policies and practices involving what many consider unfair export competition.   
The EU’s main method of supporting dairy, for example, is through export subsidies - 
paid primarily to the processors who export the dairy products, not to the producers.  
There is convincing evidence that the EU has dumped milk powder in developing 
countries.  Although the advocacy groups’ arguments that this dumping has 
undermined livelihoods are compelling, there is controversy on the subject as the 
issues are complicated and very contextual.  In regard to beef, the EU was the world’s 
largest exporter of beef for several years, and no other trading bloc or country 
provides export subsidies for beef.  The interviews confirmed the charges that the EU 
had dumped beef in West Africa in the 1980s and 1990s and in South Africa in the 
1990s.  This dumping of heavily subsidized beef undermined local production and 
marketing systems, as well as the policies and activities of various donors and NGOs 
(including the EU itself, bilateral development assistance programs of EU member 
states, and European NGOs) that were promoting livestock development and 
marketing in the regions concerned.  In regard to EU dumping of both dairy and beef, 
what might be small quantities to the EU can be very significant amounts in a 
developing country.  The potential exists for future EU dumping of dairy products and 
beef in developing countries as long as the EU agricultural production system 
continues to reward over-production and export subsidies continue to be paid. 
The second pillar. The EU’s restrictions on access to its market has been criticized by 
some developing countries, particularly major exporters of agricultural products such 
as Brazil and Argentina.  In contrast, the ACP countries are determined to defend their 
arrangements with the EU that provide them with preferential access to the European 
market.  India has criticized the EU for its preferential treatment of ACP states,
38 
another example of very different interests among developing countries.  The EU 
responded to the criticism by noting that it is the largest importer of products from 
developing countries, taking about 85% of Africa’s agricultural exports and 45% of 
Latin America’s.  In spite of these statistics and the EU’s EBA initiative, there has 
been widespread criticism that the EU does not provide fair opportunities for 
developing countries to export their agricultural products to the EU market. 
The South American countries in our first category are strong supporters of liberalizing 
international trade in agricultural products.  Simulation studies have demonstrated 
that these countries would benefit more than any other beef-exporting states 
(including developed countries) from the (a) elimination of EU export subsidies for 
beef and (b) reduction by the EU of domestic production subsidies to its own beef 
producers.  Such trade liberalization would enable the South American countries to 
benefit from greatly reduced competition from the EU in the North African and Middle 
East beef markets, and they would gain from somewhat higher prices for their beef 
exports to the EU itself.  In sharp contrast, southern African exporters of beef view 
their preferential access to the lucrative EU market under the beef protocol as very 
important and worry about the implications of the Doha Round of trade talks and CAP 
reform. 
Significantly, no one interviewed during the course of the present study was convinced 
that poor beef producers in the South American or southern African countries 
concerned would benefit directly from their country’s increased access to the EU beef 
market.  These views are related to the fact that greater - or even unrestricted - 
access to the EU beef market would not directly benefit poor producers in developing 
countries because they cannot meet current SPS standards and quality requirements.  
For example, livestock producers in LDCs already have full access to the EU beef 
market at zero duty under the EBA initiative but cannot take advantage of it.  It is SPS 
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and quality factors, not market access, that prevent poor livestock keepers from 
benefiting from trade in beef to the EU market. 
Trends in regard to SPS requirements affecting developing countries currently 
exporting or intending to export LLPs may have disturbing consequences for poor 
livestock producers.  If a developing country exports, or plans to export, LLPs to 
developed country or regional markets that require international SPS standards 
(increasingly the case as importing countries attempt to protect the health of their 
own citizens and livestock), the exports will need to meet the international 
standards.
39  Large-scale producers, including agri-business interests that can meet the 
SPS standards, may stimulate the government concerned to invest considerable sums 
of money and other resources to establish the mechanisms to certify the SPS standards 
required to export LLP products.  Because of the strictness of the certification and 
traceability requirements, however, poor livestock producers will not be in a position 
to access these markets.  When international SPS standards required under the WTO 
are applied in a particular regional market, poor livestock producers who have 
traditionally supplied this market will lose access.   
Although access by poor developing-country livestock producers to the EU market is 
not a realistic option, domestic and regional markets are extremely important for 
them.  (For example, Sahelian producers were undermined by the EU’s heavily 
subsidized exports of beef to West Africa in the 1980s and 1990s.)  Both domestic and 
regional markets should become even more important in the future as demand for 
LLPs is expected to increase.  EU policies that affect developing-country domestic and 
regional LLP markets are therefore extremely significant. 
The third pillar. EU domestic support for agriculture has been a major target 
internationally because of its role in stimulating overproduction of agricultural 
commodities.  The EU made some progress during the 1990s and in the first part of the 
2000s to decouple subsidies from production.  The CAP reform of June 2003 directly 
addressed this third key issue of the Doha agricultural negotiations.  By breaking the 
link between subsidies and production, under WTO rules the EU will be able to shift its 
domestic agricultural support from a “trade distorting” category to a “non-trade 
distorting” category.  (The validity of this shift is challenged by some WTO members, 
including developing countries, with some suggesting that it is a kind of “shell game.”)  
As noted above, the 2003 CAP reforms did not directly address the other two pillars, 
market access or export subsidies.  Beef producers have historically been major 
beneficiaries of the domestic support system, and these producers emerged from the 
June 2003 reform in comparatively good shape as only 70% decoupling was required of 
them.  Many observers noted that the widely heralded 2003 CAP reforms were a very 
diluted version of the Agricultural Commissioner’s original 2002 proposals. 
Forces for and against CAP Reform 
This report identified several forces exerting pressure for and against reform of the 
CAP.  Over the past 40 years, the CAP has greatly improved conditions for Europe’s 
farmers.  During this period there has been very effective support for the CAP from 
Europe’s farmers, their organizations and other agricultural interests.  The French 
government has been the staunchest supporter of the CAP, a reflection of the political 
power of agricultural interests in the country.  For several decades these various 
actors within Europe faced little opposition.  It was only in the late 1980s, when 
agriculture gained importance on the GATT agenda and the strain on the EU budget 
became prominent, that reform of the CAP became possible.  The declining strength 
                                                 
39 EU SPS standards are higher than international standards set by OIE and Codex, and efforts are being made to further 
strengthen EU SPS standards. 6. Summary and Recommendations 
52   
of agricultural interests – smaller and smaller shares of the European workforce are 
farmers, and agriculture is of declining importance to EU income – appears to 
strengthen the likelihood of reform.  Today there are several forces pushing for 
reform of the CAP: the ongoing Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations, continued 
budgetary pressures (some stemming from the impending enlargement, which also 
greatly complicates the operation of the CAP), food and beverage industry interests, 
and increasing pressure from consumer and other advocacy groups. 
Farmers’ and Agricultural Interests. The strength of European farmers’ 
organizations and agricultural interests has been critical to the manner in which the 
CAP has developed over the decades and why efforts to reform the CAP have been so 
limited.  Farmers and other agricultural interests have taken an interest in the CAP 
because it directly affects their livelihoods and their future.  It is normal for those so 
directly affected by policies to want to be involved in their formulation, and to try to 
maintain the policies that benefit them in the face of pressure from other interest 
groups.  Those who pay for the CAP, taxpayers and consumers, are only indirectly 
affected by the CAP and do not have such cohesive, well organized groups promoting 
their interests. Mitigating against the strength of farmers, however, is evidence of the 
decline in their position in the EU: a reduction in the proportion of the population 
employed in farming, the aging of this population as children of farmers move into 
other work, and a declining contribution to EU GDP. 
France’s Role in Protecting the CAP. France is well known as the strongest supporter 
and defender of the CAP among the EU member states.  Farmers’ organizations and 
their leaders have exceptional political influence in France.  The most powerful 
farmers’ trade union, the FNSEA, served as the sole counterpart on agricultural issues 
of all French governments from 1945 until the late 1990s. Another feature of the 
French system enhances the political power of French farmers.  France has more local 
administrative districts, many of them sparsely populated rural communes, than any 
other EU state.  In 1989, 28.5% of French mayors were active farmers (Keeler 1996).  
During the June 2003 negotiations of the Council of Agriculture Ministers on the 
proposals for CAP reform presented by the Commissioner of Agriculture, France 
threatened to use its right of veto in an effort to block additional reform. 
The Doha Round. The WTO Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations is currently 
the most important force driving reform of EU agricultural and related trade policy.  
For more than a decade, multilateral agricultural negotiations have exerted powerful 
pressure on the EU to modify the CAP.  Once the Doha Round began in November 
2001, there was tremendous pressure on the EU from its trading partners to reform 
the CAP. If it were not for the intense pressure resulting from the Doha Round, it is 
unlikely that the CAP would have been modified to the degree that it was.  Critics 
concluded that the reforms agreed were inadequate, and it was widely noted that the 
result of the negotiations was a diluted version of the Agriculture Commissioner’s 
proposals.  It is possible that the collapse of the Cancun Ministerial meeting last 
September may provide a new opening for pro-reform groups to push for further 
reform.  Missed deadlines are common in multilateral trade talks, and the previous 
Uruguay Round took eight years to complete instead of the scheduled three years. 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Multilateral trade negotiations under the auspices 
of the WTO are intended to achieve a global trading system that is based on agreed 
rules and does not discriminate between countries.  The results of such negotiations 
should be far better for developing countries than bilateral trade deals, in which one 
powerful trading partner concludes a free trade agreement with another country, or 
regional free trade agreements.  What will be necessary is to build up much further 
the capacity of developing countries to negotiate and implement multilateral trade 
rules.  It seems unlikely that developing countries will be able to obtain fair trading 
agreements from either the EU or US if there is no pressure from the multilateral 
system coordinated by the WTO. 6. Summary and Recommendations 
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Budgetary Constraints and Enlargement. Maintaining the CAP is increasingly 
expensive.   A report by the High Level Group concluded that, in order to revive 
economic growth and cut unemployment in an enlarged EU, spending on the CAP 
should be reduced by about 90%.  Indeed, the accession of ten new countries will be 
expensive for the EU.  Most of the new countries are from central and eastern 
Europe, and they are much poorer than the current EU-15. Thus the budgetary and 
political pressures will continue to be daunting. 
Food and Beverage Industry Interests. The powerful food and beverage industry 
desires some reform of the CAP for at least two reasons. First, EU domestic support 
for agriculture keeps domestic prices for primary agricultural products artificially 
high.  Since these products are necessary inputs for the food and beverage industry, 
any change – such as reducing domestic support – that can lower prices would be 
favored.  Second, the desire for cheap primary agricultural products extends to a 
desire for cheap imports.  Thus, it is in the industry’s interest to push for greater 
market access for such products. In regard to the EU’s trade in dairy and beef with 
developing countries, it is significant that it is not in the food and beverage industry’s 
interest that export subsidies be reduced. Given this constellation of interests, it 
should be no surprise that the food and beverage industry’s primary association (the 
CIAA) supported the June 2003 CAP reforms. 
Advocacy Group Pressure. Advocacy groups have had varied success in their efforts 
to reform the CAP.  Among the most successful are animal welfare and environmental 
organizations. By focusing on a narrow set of concerns over a lengthy period, these 
advocates have been able to maximize their impact on EU-agricultural policy.  Pro-
developing country advocacy groups have become more visible recently in their efforts 
to bring about CAP reform and to promote multilateral trade rules more beneficial to 
developing countries.   
For many years consumers have been among the least successful interest groups at 
promoting CAP reform. The outbreaks of BSE and foot and mouth disease among 
livestock led many consumers to worry about the agricultural production practices of 
farmers.  This concern appears to have led to a decline in the public’s sympathy for 
farmers.  This development represents a significant change as, in many European 
countries, farmers were given special consideration because (among other reasons) of 
their role in overcoming the food shortages after World War II. Given the large 
proportion of the European population who were farmers only a few decades ago, 
many non-farmers have relatives or know families who still farm, or they otherwise 
sympathize with farmers. 
Strategic Entry Points and Recommendations 
Improving prospects for poor developing-country livestock producers will require 
reforming both the CAP and multilateral trade rules.  The analysis presented in this 
report suggests a number of entry points for making EU policy more responsive to the 
problem of poverty reduction in developing countries in general and for livestock-
dependent poor people in particular.  The following pages discuss strategic entry 
points at the level of (a) the international trading system, (b) the EU member state 
and (c) the European Union itself. 
At the Level of the International Trading System 
Multilateral trade negotiations. The evidence and arguments in this report indicate 
that there are no easy answers for developing countries as a whole regarding 
multilateral trade negotiations.  It is clear that developing countries have very 
different interests regarding trade policy liberalization.  Even if the findings of 6. Summary and Recommendations 
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simulation studies describing the potential gains from trade liberalization presented in 
this report are accurate, there will likely be many negative short-term and medium-
term effects for some developing countries (especially net food-importers) even while 
other countries realize gains from increased market access (particularly for already 
successful agro-exporters such as Brazil and Argentina).  There may well be negative 
implications for developing country consumers as a result of the inevitably more 
expensive agricultural products. 
Reducing poverty among livestock-dependent poor people in developing countries will 
require action on a number of fronts.  The Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations is critical, as it is the most important force driving CAP reform and 
provides the best opportunity to achieve a global trading system that has fairer rules 
for developing countries. Multilateral trade negotiations are also the most effective 
way for developing countries to have influence on EU policy-making; without such 
influence, developing country interests will not receive adequate consideration.  All of 
the major parties (the EU, US, G-21, ACP countries, Cairns Group) in the Doha Round 
are committed to restarting the WTO agriculture trade negotiations. 
Participating in multilateral trade negotiations is a difficult, complex and expensive 
task.  The EU and US have many skilled specialists and expend enormous resources on 
the trade talks.  Some developing countries have skillful negotiators, and a smaller 
number of developing countries are able to carry out appropriate technical analysis.  
The skill and clout of the G-21 at Cancun suggests that an important new force has 
appeared on the international trade scene.
40  The G-21 made an enormous impact at 
Cancun, the first time a bloc of developing countries has so effectively confronted the 
EU and US in multilateral trade negotiations.  But it is clear that most poor developing 
countries need considerable assistance to more effectively determine their own best 
interests and then to promote them.  International organizations, the EU itself and 
some EU member states, NGOs and others are providing support and technical 
assistance to developing countries in trade matters.  There was considerable 
discussion in the press and elsewhere about the advice provided by various actors to 
developing countries before and during the Cancun ministerial meeting.  Ideological 
factors and vested interests are sometimes difficult to separate from technical advice.  
•  if progress is to be made in the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations involving 
developing countries, better targeted and more effective technical assistance is 
required.   
•  Poor countries should be assisted to develop fora to allow them to learn of each 
other’s interests and to enable them to build productive alliances. 
Trade in beef and dairy.  All three pillars of the Doha agriculture negotiations 
deserve close attention because of their interrelationships. During the present study 
the authors found a great deal of information regarding the European Union, 
Commission, EU member states, and a wide range of interest groups.  But very little 
solid information was found regarding the effects of the CAP in developing countries.  
For example, interviews revealed considerable disagreement regarding whether the 
EU’s subsidized exports of skimmed milk powder actually undermine livelihoods of the 
poor in developing countries.  Policy decisions, as well as more effective advocacy, on 
such issues require solid information and analysis, and the information appears lacking 
in regard to this controversial topic.  
•  Particular focus of Doha negotiations should be devoted to EU export support for 
dairy products, especially milk powder, and for beef. 
                                                 
40 The Group of 21 represents over half the world’s population and about two-thirds of its farmers, according to 
representatives of the group speaking at Cancun in September 2003.  Among the G-21 are some of the most influential 
developing countries in the WTO, including Brazil, China, India and South Africa. 6. Summary and Recommendations 
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•   A study should be conducted to collect and analyze relevant information on the 
effects of the EU’s subsidized exports of milk powder in selected developing 
countries, focusing on whether and how such exports undermine livelihoods and 
hinder efforts to reduce poverty (and, if yes, the key consequences). 
SPS standards. The present study found that poor livestock producers may lose out as 
a result of the application of international SPS standards.  For example, producers 
who have been supplying developing-country markets may lose access to these 
markets if international level SPS standards are applied.  This is another case where 
sound information is required to provide a basis for informed policy decisions and 
more effective advocacy.  There are ongoing studies and other efforts to determine 
the relevant effects of the application of international SPS standards in selected 
regional livestock markets in developing countries. There is no question that SPS 
standards are important to protect the health and safety of consumers, and that 
improving access to animal health services in developing countries is essential to 
improving the health and productivity of their livestock.  However, the cost of 
compliance with international SPS standards has become, and will continue to be, a 
major concern for developing countries that do (or intend to) export to markets that 
require international SPS standards.  Issues surrounding how these SPS standards can 
be effectively met are relevant to poor livestock producers in developing countries, as 
these countries will need appropriate assistance to develop (and effectively use) the 
relevant infrastructure to be able to certify that specific products meet the 
requirements.  The great expense involved in upgrading often weak existing systems 
to the international level raises serious questions in some cases about whether 
developing the capacity to meet international SPS standards is really in the best 
interests of poor developing countries.  
•  Studies should be conducted on whether and how (and, if yes, the results) the SPS 
standards prevent poor producers from accessing regional livestock markets, 
particularly producers who have accessed these markets for many years. 
•  Policy decisions on the cost of compliance and how compliance can be met, and 
more effective advocacy on these issues, require additional information and 
analysis to determine if the costs of compliance with the international SPS 
standards are the most appropriate use of scarce resources in specific developing 
countries. 
•  Additional attention needs to be focused on developing and implementing 
appropriate forms of: (a) representation by developing countries in the 
international organizations that determine and supervise SPS standards, and (b) 
representation of poor livestock producers on the bodies that determine and 
supervise national SPS policy in developing countries. 
•  More attention should be given to tariff escalation issues because it is not well 
understood how great a disincentive such tariff policies are to developing countries 
that may have the capacity to produce value-added goods.  In particular, 
consideration should be given to goods related to livestock production that are not 
necessarily classified as agricultural products.  For example, it has been suggested 
that some developing countries may have a comparative advantage in the 
production and export of leather.  The EU places higher tariffs on leather imports 
than on imports of raw hides and skins. 
At the Levels of the EU and the EU Member State 
The bargaining role and influence of individual member states. The policy-making 
process surrounding EU agriculture and trade policy is complicated and sophisticated. 
The CAP is a very important political, economic and social institution, and efforts to 
reform the CAP reach the highest levels of European politics.  Heads of state have 
intervened at key moments to influence and even alter CAP reform efforts. 6. Summary and Recommendations 
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The bargaining role of individual leaders such as Chirac and Schroeder, and the role of 
France as the leading defender of the CAP, are important at the EU level.  However, 
these political leaders and their governments operate under certain constraints, some 
of which are determined by the structural nature of EU policy-making.  At the 
member-state level of EU politics, it might be useful to consider further the 
possibilities of pro-CAP reform movements and possibilities in France.  Over the years 
France has played an extraordinarily influential role in maintaining the position of the 
CAP.  By threatening a veto during the June 2003 negotiations on CAP reform, France 
clearly demonstrated that it remains the major obstacle to deeper reform of the CAP.  
Those interested in reforming the CAP should examine more thoroughly the evidence 
that disunity exists in the French position. 
•  Closer analysis of politics at the member state level, especially in France, may help 
identify additional strategic entry points that were beyond the range of the present 
analysis. 
Interest and advocacy groups and the consumer. The experiences of interest groups 
suggest entry points for those wishing to influence EU policy.  As farmers’ 
organizations as well as food and beverage industry interests have demonstrated, it 
can pay off to develop long-term relationships with Commission officials and key 
member-state politicians.  While building such relationships would be useful to 
advocacy groups as well, it is unlikely that they have the same kind of opportunities.  
Advocacy groups have been successful at raising awareness of their concerns among 
the public, however, and it is through public pressure that they have had their 
greatest influence on key decision makers.  The successes of environmental and 
animal rights advocates in influencing CAP reform may be relevant to pro-developing 
country advocacy groups, although there appears to be more concern within Europe 
for environmental issues (and animal rights issues in parts of Europe) than for the 
problems of developing countries.
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Consumers in the EU have become increasingly concerned with and mobilized around 
food safety.  Public debate in the media and elsewhere about food safety – including 
concerns about BSE and the introduction of genetically modified organisms – have led 
to an electorate which has a sophisticated understanding of food safety issues. In the 
run-up to the June 2003 CAP reform negotiations, alliances were formed between 
consumer groups, pro-developing country advocates, and environmentalists (the BEUC, 
Oxfam and WWF).  Such alliances may give these advocacy groups the additional 
influence necessary to more effectively oppose the powerful interests resisting CAP 
reform. 
•  For those involved in advocacy efforts, long-term strategies focused on raising 
public awareness may have the best pay-off. 
•  It would be useful for international organizations to publicize more widely the 
findings of key research on relevant policy issues as opinion pieces in leading 
newspapers, as well as to send policy briefs to the staffs of senior politicians and to 
officials of EU member states, the Commission, members of the European 
Parliament and others. 
•  It might be possible to tap into this deep European concern with food safety to 
promote greater concern with the problems of poor agricultural producers in 
developing countries. 
Policy coherence.  The CAP reforms achieved so far represent important steps to 
respond to European societal concerns and the efforts of advocacy groups in regard to 
the environment, food safety and animal welfare.  The charges that the interrelated 
CAP and EU trade policies undermine efforts to reduce poverty in developing countries 
                                                 
41 To put this point in comparative perspective, in Europe there is much greater interest in and concern for developing 
countries than there is in the U.S. 6. Summary and Recommendations 
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have not yet been seriously addressed by the EU as a whole, although some member 
states actively promote “policy coherence” in regard to the EU’s agricultural, trade 
and development cooperation policies.  On the basis of the interviews it is clear that 
the organizations and groups concerned with reducing poverty (in general and, more 
specifically, among poor livestock producers) in developing countries share many goals 
with the organizations and units promoting coherence between these three sets of EU 
policies.  At the EU level, DG Development is in the forefront in this field, and the 
activities of DG Agriculture and DG Trade are relevant.  At the member-state level, 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands are leaders in these efforts.  DFID supports 
many activities aimed at reducing poverty in developing countries, including better 
understanding of the role of trade.  The Netherlands may be the only country to have 
established a specific Policy Coherence Unit in its Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
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•  Additional interaction between these organizations may well produce results that 
help reduce poverty among poor livestock producers in developing countries. 
Reforming the CAP and achieving multilateral trade rules that are fair to developing 
countries are critical to reducing poverty in developing countries.  But trade in 
agriculture is only one element in reducing poverty in developing countries in 
general, and for the livestock dependent poor in particular.  Other essential steps 
include the formulation and implementation of appropriate and effective policies in 
developing countries themselves.  These policies need to be part of a larger 
development strategy for each country that includes macroeconomic policy, 
education, health, infrastructure, governance and rights of access to resources. 
                                                 
42 The work of the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development and the South Centre, both in Geneva, is 
relevant.  
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ANNEX 1: NOTES ON THEORY  
Theoretically, our approach
43 to understanding EU policy-making is close to that of 
Andrew Moravcsik’s well-known thesis of ‘liberal intergovernmentalism,’ but even 
closer to the ‘three-level game’ framework that Lee Ann Patterson uses to explain the 
1988 and 1992 CAP reforms. Moravcsik’s (1993) theory, briefly stated, is that major 
decisions in European integration take place in two stages. First, national preferences 
are formed, influenced by the conditions of economic interdependence. Second, at 
the ‘intergovernmental’ level of analysis, outcomes are seen as the result of 
bargaining power and functional incentives (high transaction costs and domestic 
agenda control).  There are at least two limitations to using this theory to understand 
current EU policy-making (and it should be noted that Moravcik’s theory is meant to 
explain integration, not policy).  The first is that it is too narrow.  International 
factors and actors, those outside the EU, are generally missing from the picture. It 
may also imply there are steps in policy formation from the national to the EU level, 
when in reality the situation is far more complex.  The second is that it goes too far in 
the direction of seeing policy-making as a clash between national interests. An 
alternative view, that of social constructivists, is that simply being a part of the EU 
changes the beliefs and preferences of EU member states and their politicians.  In 
effect, membership alters their very ‘being.’  This is not our position either. Our 
position instead is again somewhere in-between.  Many individual policy makers do 
tend to follow the ‘intergovernmentalist’ line.  Yet many relevant actors are defined 
by the EU — some were even created as a result of its formation. Their actions cannot 
be explained on the basis of local preference formation, but must be viewed in a more 
transnational context. We also note again the important role played by EU 
institutions, beyond just that of ‘setting the rules of the game.’ 
Patterson’s three-level framework allows us to move beyond some of these limitations 
by drawing on Putnam’s work with ‘2-level games’: 
Putnam describes the players in a two-level game in the following way. At the national 
level of the game “domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians are seeking power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups.” At the international level, Putnam argues 
that “national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic 
pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.” 
However, in the case of the EC, there is an additional level of play, the community 
level, in which member states attempt to achieve domestic goals while simultaneously 
pursuing cooperative integration. Thus the unique structure of the EC requires that 
Putnam’s two-level game be expanded to a three-level interactive game in which 
negotiations at the domestic, community and international levels affect policy options 
at each of the other levels. 
There are two ways in which these levels related to each other. The first is that issue 
linkage at a higher level can alter feasible outcomes at the domestic level. Patterson 
and Putnam call this ‘synergistic linkage.’ The second is that pressure at a higher level 
(EC or international) can expand the range of agreements that could possibly gain a 
majority domestically, facilitating agreement.  She and Putnam call this 
‘reverberation’ and the range of possible winning agreements a ‘win-set.’ Moravcsik 
and Putnam both identify Individual leaders as playing a key role in such linkages, as 
they are often faced with the challenge of building domestic coalitions while 
                                                 
43 One dimension of explanations of EU policy making can be viewed as a continuum.  At one end lie those approaches that 
tend to treat the European Union as a state (see, for example, the work of Simon Hix).  At the other end are those that 
tend to treat the European Union as an international organization not very unlike the WTO.  We believe it best to look 
somewhere in-between. Annex 1: Notes on Theory 
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contending with opposition forces to maintain legitimacy. Our analysis sees both 
France’s Chirac and Germany’s Schroeder playing such roles.  
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ANNEX 2: EU VOTING, POPULATION AND REPRESENTATION 
EU Council Voting, Population and European Parliament Representation Under the Treaty of 
Nice. 
 
Votes  % EU Population  MEPS 
 
Current  Post-Nice  Current  EU-27 
Population 
(millions)  Current  Post-
Nice 
EU Members 
Germany 10  29  21.90  17.05  82.04  99  99 
UK 10  29  15.81  12.31  59.25  87  72 
France 10  29  15.74  12.25  58.97  87  72 
Italy 10  29  15.38  11.97  57.61  87  72 
Spain 8  27  10.51  8.18  39.39  64  50 
Netherlands 5  13  4.20  3.27  15.76  31  25 
Greece 5  12  2.81  2.18  10.53  25  22 
Belgium 5  12  2.72  2.12  10.21  25  22 
Portugal 5  12  2.66  2.07  9.98  25  22 
Sweden 4  10  2.36  1.83  8.85  22  18 
Austria 4  10  2.15  1.67  8.08  21  17 
Denmark 3  7  1.41  1.10  5.31  16  13 
Finland 3  7  1.37  1.07  5.16  16  13 
Ireland 3  7  0.99  0.77  3.74  15  12 
Luxembourg 2  4  0.11  0.08  0.43  6  6 
Subtotal  87  237    77.92  375.31  626  535 
EU Accession States 
Poland   27    8.03  38.67    50 
Romania   14    4.67  22.49    33 
Czech Republic    12    2.13  10.29    20 
Hungary   12    2.09  10.09    20 
Bulgaria   10    1.71  8.23    17 
Slovakia   7    1.12  5.39    13 
Lithuania   7    0.76  3.70    12 
Latvia   4    0.50  2.44    8 Annex 2: EU Voting, Population and Representation 
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Slovenia   4    0.41  1.98    7 
Estonia   4    0.30  1.45    6 
Cyprus   4    0.15  0.75    6 
Malta   3    0.07  0.38    5 
Subtotal    108    21.94  105.86    197 
Totals  87  345  ~100  ~100  481.2  626  732 
QMV  62 
(71.3%) 
255 
(73.9%)          
Blocking 
Minority  26 91         
 
Source:  EU 2003b 
Notes: Votes for Romania and Bulgaria will come into force upon their accession, which will occur later than 
the other candidate countries. 
The QMV system has often been controversial. With the EU-15, for instance, Luxembourg receives 
approximately one vote for every 200,000 inhabitants; Germany one vote for every 8,000,000.  
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ANNEX 3: THE SAPIR GROUP REPORT 
Independent Report Calls for Massive Cuts in CAP Spending 
A report released in mid-July 2003 shocked many in Brussels and elsewhere in Europe 
by its call for an extraordinary change in EU agriculture policy, including drastic 
spending reductions.  The report follows in a tradition of influential think pieces that 
have shaped EU policy over the years, such as the report that laid the foundations of 
the single market and the European single currency.  It is highly relevant to the 
present study of EU policy-making that that such critical views regarding the CAP have 
been (a) publicly presented by a reputable group, and (b) so sharply attacked by EU 
officials and others. 
EC President Romano Prodi had requested the report by a panel of independent and 
prestigious academics last year.  Mr Prodi disavowed the report once its contents were 
released.  The “High Level Group,” chaired by Andre Sapir of the University of 
Brussels, recommended massive cuts in CAP spending and re-nationalization to EU 
member states of many of the agricultural policy’s functions.  The group concluded 
that, to revive economic growth and cut unemployment in an expanded EU, major 
savings needed to come from cutting the agriculture budget.  The resulting savings 
could be better used in research and development, education, cross-border 
infrastructure, spending on economic cohesion between regions, and economic 
restructuring.  Significant structural changes would occur in the agriculture sector.  
Some elements of the CAP would remain with Brussels while the rest of agricultural 
spending would be returned to member states.  It was recognized that differing levels 
of subsidies in different countries would produce conflicts with EU law over state aids, 
as well as disruptions in the internal market.   
Under the High Level Group’s proposals, agriculture spending at the EU level would 
drop from about 50% of the total EU budget at present to only 5%, one-tenth the 
current level.  The reduction in CAP spending was justified by four reasons.  One, the 
present budget share of the CAP was seen as so large that, unless brought under 
control, no significant reallocation of resources within an EU budget of the current 
size would be possible.  Two, the CAP was now a redistributive policy for spreading 
wealth to farmers instead of an instrument to promote efficiency and production, and 
the micro-management of such a policy would be better executed at the national 
level.  Three, the heterogeneous nature of farming in an EU of up to 27 members 
states (with differing landscapes, agriculture structures and levels of relative wealth) 
would make a “one size fits all” rural policy unworkable.  Four, the CAP simply did not 
deliver in terms of promoting the economic well being of the EU.  This last reason was 
considered the most important.  The group recognized the potential for state aid 
problems and market distortions that would arise from a re-nationalization of 
agriculture, but suggested that existing competition law could deal with these issues. 
The European Commission distanced itself from the High Level Group’s findings, 
emphasizing that the views were not those of the Commission and that no EU money 
had been paid to the authors.  A Commission spokesperson noted that giving back 
money and policy management to member s t at e s  w o uld  d o  m uch  m o r e  ha r m  t ha n 
good.  He added that having up to 27 national farm policies would not reduce red tape 
or improve policy consistency. (Agra Europe 18 and 25 July 2003) 
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ANNEX 4: EXCERPTS FROM THE SPS AGREEMENT 
Excerpts from Annex A (“Definitions”) of the SPS Agreement 
1.   Sanitary or phytosanitary measure – Any measure applied: 
a.   to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the Member from 
risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-
carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms; 
b.  to protect human or animal life or health within the territory of the Member from 
risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins, or disease-causing organisms in 
foods, beverages or feedstuffs; 
c.  to protect human life or health within the territory of the Member from risks 
arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the 
entry, establishment or spread of pests; or 
d.  to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the Member from entry, 
establishment or spread of pests. 
3.  International standards, guidelines and recommendations 
a.  for food safety, the standards, guidelines and recommendations established by 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission relating to food additives, veterinary drug 
and pesticide residues, contaminants, methods of analysis and sampling, and 
codes and guidelines of hygienic practice; 
b.   for animal health and zoonoses, the standards, guidelines and recommendations 
developed under the auspices of the International Office of Epizootics; 
c.    for plant health, the international standards, guidelines and recommendations 
developed under the auspices of the Secretariat of the International Plant 
Protection Convention in cooperation with regional organizations operating within 
the framework of the International Plant Protection Convention; and 
d.  for matters not covered by the above organizations, appropriate standards, 
guidelines and recommendations promulgated by other relevant international 
organizations open for membership to all Members, as identified by the 
Committee. 
5.  Appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection – The level of protection deemed 
appropriate by the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health within its territory. 
  
NOTE: Many Members otherwise refer to this concept as the “acceptable level of risk”  
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ANNEX 5: BACKGROUND STATISTICS FOR FRANCE, GERMANY,  
THE NETHERLANDS, THE UK AND THE EU-15 
 
  France  Germany  Netherlands  United 
Kingdom  EU-15 
Population 59,037,000  82,260,000  15,987,000 59,863,000  377,995,000 
Land Area  549,087 km2  357,028 km2  35,518 km2  244,101 km2  3,235,390 
km2 
GDP, US$ bn (2002)  1,424   2,218 384  1,573  7,930  (2001) 
GDP/Inhabitant (PPS)  23,620  24,140  26,020  23,160  23,180 
Share (%) of 
Agriculture in GDP 
2.2 0.9  2.2  0.6 1.7 
1970 13.5  8.6  -  -  - 
1980 8.5  5.3  4.9  2.4  - 
1990 5.6  3.7  4.6  2.2  - 
2000 4.2  2.6  3.3  1.5  4.3 




2001 4.1  2.6  3.1  1.4  4.2 
% Household 
Expenditure on Food 
17.6 15.8  10.5  13.9 16.1 
CAP funds received 





1.11; 2.7% of 
total 
3.99; 9.6% of 
total 
- 
CAP funds received 
for “animal 
products” (billion €) 
2.16; 22.7% 
of total 
0.97; 10.1 % 
of total 













Roughly even  - 












on Agriculture (2000) 
3.24 bn euro  1.6 bn euro  1.09 bn euro  1.11 bn euro  - 
 
Sources: DG Agriculture (2003), DG Budget (2002), Economist (Various Issues), Economist Intelligence Unit 
(Various Country Profiles), OECD (2003b), WTO (2002a)  
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ANNEX 6: CURRENT EU SUPPORT FOR LLPS 
The European Union is currently one of the largest producers of livestock and livestock 
products in the world.  Table 1 provides data on production levels for the EU and 
other leading countries in regard to various LLP categories.  The EU is the leading 
producer of dairy products (milk, butter, skimmed milk powder and whole milk 
powder), and the second largest producer of beef and veal.  The production of LLPs by 
the EU is directly linked to support under the CAP.   
A study of the global beef trade, the Magellan Project, reported that the EU had the 
highest level of support to beef producers of any country or trading bloc.
44   The EU 
alone accounts for 78% of OECD total support levels concerning beef.  According to 
this study, “Beef in the European Union is one of the most highly protected 
agricultural sectors in the world.”  Support is provided through: (a) tariff quotas which 
severely restrict market access, (b) internal support in the form of intervention buying 
and private storage aids to maintain domestic prices, (c) direct payments to producers 
of an array of premiums, and (d) export refunds paid to beef exporters (MLA 2002, 
MLA 2003).  
European Union beef producers receive most of their gross returns from government 
programs rather than from the value of beef at world prices, according to Magellan 
Project studies.  Market price support is the major form of support for EU beef 
producers, accounting for about 60% of total support.  Such market price support is 
primarily provided by tariffs and tariff quotas that raise internal prices above world 
prices.  The EU is the only trading bloc which uses export subsidies for beef.  In 1996-
1997 the EU encountered difficulties in meeting its WTO reduction commitments on 
export subsidies.  The subsequent outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
(BSE) led to heavy slaughtering of cattle and reduced exports of beef.  The WTO 
commitments do not currently constrain EU beef exports.  During the past ten years 
there has been little change in regard to outsiders’ access to the EU beef market.  The 
previous quota system has been changed into an array of tariff quotas with very high 
out-of-quota tariffs.  Country allocations of the various quotas have changed very 
little.  During the same period, the EU’s support to its own beef producers has 
increased significantly.  Beef producers in the EU receive the highest levels of support 
of any meat producers (MLA 2002, MLA 2003). 
 
                                                 
44 The five countries of Australia, Canada, Mexico, New Zealand and the United States have a major stake in the world beef 
trade.  In 2001 beef producers in these five countries for the first time collaborated to undertake sector-specific research 
to estimate the gains from further liberalization of the global beef market.  The group call themselves the “Five Nations” 
and the joint study the group initiated and supported was named the “Magellan Project.” Annex 6: Current EU Support for LLPS 
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Table:  Breakdown of expenditure (financial year 2001) by sector according to the economic 
nature of the measures. 
 
2001 (Million Euro) 
“intervention” 
2001 budget 















Milk & milk 
products  1,906.6 1,106.5      800.1 -46.7     0.0        0.0 846.8   0.0
Beef/veal  6,054.0    362.6  5,691.4 325.8 523.7 4,714.4 138.4   0.0
Sheepmeat 




   137.1    115.7        21.4    4.9     9.5        0.0    -15.0 21.9
Total  9,545.0  1,584.8  7,960.2  284.0  533.2 6,163.6  968.3  21.9 
Source:  DG Agriculture 2003e 
 
In 2002, LLPs accounted for 24.5% of the EU’s total EAGGF Guarantee Section budget.  
Almost 75% of those monies were earmarked for beef and veal products, with a much 
smaller proportion going to milk and milk products.  In 2001, the largest source of 
domestic support for beef products was through “intervention,” especially direct aids. 
This pattern contrasts with EU support for milk and milk products that relied far more 
heavily on export subsidies.
45 
                                                 
45 The EU is the world’s largest importer of ingredients for animal feed (Hasha, 2002).  Since the establishment of the EAGGF 
in 1962, animal feed has not been subject to EEC/EU protection.  Heavy dependence on imports, some observers conclude, 
has led the EU to develop the intensive livestock production practices that enable it to export surpluses (European Farmers 
Coordination, 2003).    
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ANNEX 7: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE EU BUDGET: “OPERATIONAL” 
BUDGETARY BALANCE * 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  Overall 
this period 
Austria  -788.0 -264.5 -779.8 -629.2 -628.8 -447.8  -536.4  N.C.
a 
Belgium  463.0  16.5 -395.7 -406.5 -314.6 -214.1  -629.5 N.C. 
Denmark  502.1 273.4 131.0  7.1 122.6 240.5  -229.0  N.B.
b 
Finland  -70.6  72.6  39.8 -102.4 -194.8  274.5  -150.4 N.C. 
France  -937.9 -822.2  -1,284.3 -864.5  30.0 -739.4  -2,035.4 N.C. 
Germany  -11,092.4  -10,405.9  -10,553 -8,044.2 -8,494.0 -8,280.2  -6,953.3  N.C. 
Greece  3,589.1 4,039.0 4,360.5 4,735.7 3,818.0 4,433.3  4,513.2  N.B. 
Ireland  2,089.0 2,421.8 2,814.4 2,379.2 1,978.7 1,720.8  1,203.1  N.B. 
Italy  -62.0 -1,693.0  -229.6 -1,410.6  -753.9  1,210.1  -1,977.9  N.C. 
Luxembourg  -54.9 -45.8 -54.3 -76.6 -85.0 -56.6  -144.1  N.C. 
Netherlands  -554.2 -1,295.0 -1,087.5 -1,539.8 -1,827.0 -1,540.3  -2,256.8  N.C. 
Portugal  2,571.3 2,839.1 2,717.3 3,018.9 2,858.2 2,168.5  1,794.2  N.B. 
Spain  7,676.3 5,970.2 5,782.8 7,141.1 7,382.4 5,346.8  7,738.3  N.B. 
Sweden  -673.6 -587.9  -1,097.7 -779.9 -897.3  -1,059.5  -973.3 N.C. 
UK  -2,657.1  -518.3  -242.6 -3,489.3 -2,826.7 -2,985.9  707.5  N.C. 
Total  0.0  0.0  121.4  -60.9  167.8  70.8  70.3   
 
Source:  European Commission (September 2002) 
a N.C. = Net Contributor for 1995-2001 
b N.B. = Net Beneficiary for 1995-2001 
*after UK correction and based on UK rebate definition 
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ANNEX 8: EMPLOYMENT IN AGRICULTURE AND OTHER SECTORS 
 
  1970  1980  1990  2000  2001 
EU-15  :  :  :    4.3    4.2 
Austria  18.7  10.6    7.9    6.1    5.8 
Belgium    5.0    3.2    2.7    1.9    1.4 
Denmark  11.5    8.1    5.7    3.7    3.5 
Finland  24.4  13.5    8.4    6.2    5.8 
France  13.5    8.5    5.6    4.2    4.1 
Germany    8.6    5.3    3.7    2.6    2.6 
Greece  40.8 31.3 23.9 17.0 16.0 
Ireland  27.1  18.3  15.0    7.9    7.0 
Italy  20.2  14.3    8.8    5.2    5.2 
Luxembourg    9.7    5.5    3.3    2.4    1.5 
Netherlands  :    4.9    4.6    3.3    3.1 
Portugal  :  28.6 18.0 12.5 12.9 
Spain  29.5  19.3  11.8    6.9    6.5 
Sweden    8.1    5.1    3.4    2.9    2.6 
United Kingdom  :    2.4    2.2    1.5    1.4 
CC – 10  :  :  :  13.3  13.2 
Cyprus  :  :  :    5.4    4.9 
Czech Republic  :  :  :    5.2    4.9 
Estonia  :  :  :    7.0    7.1 
Hungary  :  :  :    6.5    6.1 
Latvia :  :  :  14.4  15.1 
Lithuania :  :  :  18.4  16.5 
Malta  :  :  :    1.4    2.1 
Poland :  :  :  18.7  19.2 
Slovenia  :  :  :    9.6    9.9 
Slovakia  :  :  :    6.9    6.3 
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